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ABSTRACT 
Influenza is one of re-emerging infectious disease in Thailand. The true burden of influenza is 
not known and is needed for influenza preparedness. Thailand has a vaccine policy targeted at 
healthcare workers (HCWs), people aged 6-24 months or >65 years, people with chronic 
medical condition (CMC), and pregnant women. However, amount of vaccine is limited and 
policy planners need information for vaccine prioritization. The government also promotes 
non-pharmaceutical interventions, but their impact is not well studied. This research aimed to 
use agent-based model (ABM) to estimate influenza burden in Thailand and assess impact of 
control measures. The basic reproductive number (R0) based on Thailand's context is unknown 
and should be estimated for further studies of influenza dynamics. The R0 was estimated using 
a formula relating the epidemic growth rate (r) and generation time. The projection of influenza 
burden was studied by fitting an ABM. The model contains a 58,354,744 synthetic Thai 
population and incorporates people with CMC and HCWs. At start, 100 agents were randomly 
assigned for initial infection. The model simulated the interactions of individuals with others 
over 180 days. Impacts of influenza vaccine were simulated at 50%, 75% and 100% coverage. 
Impacts of face mask wearing and hand washing were simulated at 10%, 25%, 50%, 75% and 
100% coverage. The R0 estimates ranged from 1.11 to 1.77 (median 1.39). The highest attack 
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rate occurs in school-age children and adolescents (15.32%). One Hundred percent coverage of 
target population policy can avoid morbidity and mortality by 47.06% and 59.61% in total 
population respectively. However, the benefit is very small for HCWs (3.75% case reduction). 
The extended policy to include children aged 2-18 years old can avoid >99% of cases. 
For non-pharmaceutical interventions, at least 50% compliance of the combined face mask use 
and hand washing policy can avoid morbidity and mortality >98% for all adherence of mask 
wearing. The public health significance of this research is that it provided information for 
health policy makers to guide optimized target population for vaccine, and to encourage non-
pharmaceutical interventions for controlling influenza outbreak. 
Key words: Reproductive number, Influenza, Vaccine, Mask, Hand washing, Thailand, 
Computer simulation 
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1.0  INTRODUCTION 
1.1 OVERVIEW 
Influenza is a contagious respiratory illness caused by ribonucleic acid (RNA) influenza viruses 
in members of Orthomyxoviridae. The disease is characterized by fever, headache, myalgia, 
malaise, sore throat, cough and rhinitis. Influenza in individuals may be indistinguishable from 
disease caused by other respiratory viruses. The clinical picture may range from the common 
cold, croup, bronchiolitis, viral pneumonia and undifferentiated acute respiratory diseases.  
The virus is transmitted easily from person to person.  One method of transmission is via 
large droplets (>5 µm) that are produced when infected people cough or sneeze.1 The virus can 
also be spread by contact transmission. Infected people will often touch their mucus membranes 
or respiratory secretions before direct interpersonal contact such as hand shaking, or indirect 
contact such as touching common surfaces. For example, influenza virus was detected on over 
50% of the fomites tested in homes and day care centers during influenza season.2 Uninfected 
individuals touch these surfaces causing hands contaminated with infected secretions, then touch 
their mucous membranes and get infection. The incubation period is short, usually 1 - 3 days. 
Period of communicability is approximately 3-5 days from clinical onset in adults, up to 7 day in 
young children. 
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Most people who get the influenza will have mild illness and will recover within one to 
two weeks without requiring any medical treatment. However, some people are more likely to 
get influenza complications and require hospitalization. People at high risk for developing 
complications including children younger than 5 years old (especially children younger than 2 
years old), adults 65 years of age and older, pregnant women, and people suffering from medical 
conditions (such as lung diseases, diabetes, cancer, kidney or heart problems). In these people, 
the infection may lead to severe complications of underlying diseases, pneumonia and death. 
In April 2009, a novel swine-origin influenza A (H1N1) virus was identified and caused 
outbreaks of influenza in at least 74 countries. It was at this time that the World Health 
Organization (WHO) declared the start of a new pandemic influenza. These events raised 
concern and increased interest in better understanding the potential impact of the flu and possible 
strategies for control measures.  Crucial in this planning is an understanding of the basic 
epidemiology and the transmission dynamics of the disease in various settings, thus leading to 
potential methods of control for a future pandemic. 
Computational models have been used to understand the transmission dynamics of 
influenza.3-5 They have also been used as health policy tools to predict the effect of public health 
interventions on mitigating future epidemics or pandemics.6-8 The models can project plausible 
scenarios, compare and guide control strategies. Many studies generated models in developed 
countries or in developing countries using basic reproductive number (R0) which was estimated 
from influenza outbreak in these countries. However, there are limited information of influenza 
transmissibility in social contact pattern of Southeast Asia countries including Thailand. 
Thailand needs reliable information of influenza burden that specific to Thailand disease 
dynamics for influenza preparedness. The understanding of transmission dynamics and 
 2 
determinants of seasonality should assist in developing better-focused prevention and control 
strategies for annual endemic outbreaks and influenza pandemics. 
This study will determine influenza burden in no-intervention scenario, intervention to 
prevent outbreak, and intervention to control outbreak. 
1.2 EPIDEMIOLOGY OF INFLUENZA 
Three types of influenza virus are recognized: A, B and C. Influenza A is associated with 
widespread epidemics and pandemics; Influenza B is infrequently associated with regional or 
widespread epidemics; Influenza C is associated with sporadic cases and minor localized 
outbreaks. Influenza A viruses can be subtyped according to the antigenic and genetic nature of 
their surface glycoproteins; 16 hemagglutinin (HA) and 9 neuraminidase (NA) subtypes have 
been identified to date.9 Viruses bearing all known HA and NA subtypes have been isolated from 
avian hosts, but only viruses of the H1N1, H2N2, and H3N2 subtypes have been associated with 
widespread epidemics in humans. Different subtypes have not been identified among influenza B 
and C viruses. 
 The long-term maintenance of influenza viruses in the human population is due to 
antigenic variation that takes place in the HA and NA surface glycoproteins of the virus. 
Antigenic variation causes an individual susceptible to new strains despite previous infection by 
influenza viruses or previous influenza vaccination. There are two type of the variation, antigenic 
drift and antigenic shift. A first type of variation, antigenic drift, is a process by which the 
accumulation of point mutations in the HA and NA genes in influenza A. During antigenic drift, 
a variety of mutations including substitutions, deletions, and insertions produce genetic variation 
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in influenza viruses. These mutations occur because a viral RNA polymerase that lacks 
proofreading activity transcribes the influenza genome. Thus, non-deleterious errors that occur 
during genome replication may be preserved and subsequently amplified if conditions favor their 
survival. These genetic changes often encode amino acid changes in the surface proteins that 
permit the virus to escape neutralization by antibody generated to previous strains. This type of 
variation is responsible for frequent epidemics and regional outbreaks and necessitate annual 
reformulation of influenza vaccine.  
A second type of variation, antigenic shift, occurs at irregular intervals and only among 
influenza A viruses and describes a major antigenic change whereby a virus with a new HA 
(with or without a new NA) is introduced into the human population. Antigenic shift occurs in at 
least two ways. It may occur when an animal or avian influenza A virus is transmitted without 
reassortment from an animal reservoir to humans or when a progeny virus with a new HA (with 
or without a new NA) arises as a result of genetic reassortment between animal and human 
influenza A viruses. This type of variation is responsible for pandemics influenza. 
 Influenza occurs in both pandemic and interpandemic forms. Pandemics, defined as 
sustained spread of new influenza shift variants in at least 2 WHO regions. There were three 
pandemics in the 20th century. Morbidity and mortality due to influenza are usually particularly 
high during the occasional global pandemic.  The mortality burden of the 1918 A(H1N1) 
pandemic or 'Spanish flu' was estimated at least 20 million deaths, globally;10 followed by the 
1957 H2N2 'Asian flu' and 1968 H3N2 'Hong Kong flu' pandemics which had less severity. On 
the other hand, in the years between influenza pandemics, which are called interpandemic 
periods, influenza epidemics occur almost every year, following a regular seasonal pattern in 
temperate zones and are called seasonal influenza. The seasonal influenza is usually less severe 
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in its impact compared to pandemic influenza, but can also show considerable between-year 
variation. 
1.2.1 Influenza seasonality 
Each year, influenza A and/or B viruses circulate during winter months in the temperate climates 
of the Northern and Southern hemispheres, overtly causing extensive epidemics of acute 
respiratory infections (ARI) in 5%-15% of the total population. The WHO estimates the average 
global burden of seasonal influenza comes to be on the order of 600 million cases, 3 million 
cases of severe illness and 250,000 - 500,000 deaths per year.11  Most seasons dominated by 
influenza A(H3N2), while influenza A(H1N1) and influenza B seasons are usually less prevalent 
and less severe.12 Localized epidemics within a community often have a characteristic pattern in 
which the epidemic begins abruptly, peaks within 2 to 3 weeks, and has a total duration of 5 to 
10 weeks.13 
The influenza seasonal pattern varies depending on the region in the world. In temperate 
climate zones, influenza epidemic is generally seasonal: the disease is thought to exist at a low 
level throughout the year, with activity increasing in the late fall and peaking in mid-winter. In 
the Northern Hemisphere, influenza outbreaks and epidemics typically occur between November 
and March, whereas in the Southern Hemisphere, influenza activity occurs between April and 
September.14 For the tropical zones, seasonal patterns are less pronounced and influenza virus 
can be more easily identified throughout the year, with a possible peak in June to August during 
the hot rainy season.15,16   
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To date, mechanisms contribute to influenza seasonality remain unclear. Some 
mechanisms have been proposed to explain the seasonality including contact rates, virus 
survival, and host immunity. 
• Contact rates 
Increased proximity between susceptible and infected individuals is frequently suggested to be 
an important factor of influenza virus transmission. The person-to-person spread of aerosol 
particles is greatly enhanced by crowding of susceptible individuals around each infective 
subject, thereby maximizing the potential for the spread of infection.  
Increasing risk of disease transmission has been observed among group of travelers. 
Baker et al. investigated pandemic influenza A/H1N1 2009 influenza outbreak on passenger 
aircraft and considered 107 passengers seated in the rear section of the plane to be susceptible 
cohort. They estimated the overall risk of in-flight infection in the rear section of the plane to be 
1.9% (95% confidence interval 0.3% to 6.0%). For the 57 passengers sitting within two rows of 
the laboratory confirmed symptomatic cases the risk was higher at 3.5% (0.6% to 11.1%).17 Han 
et al. investigated an outbreak of influenza A pandemic (H1N1) 2009 occurred among 31 
members of a tour group in China. They found that for the 16 tourists who had talked with the 
index influenza case-patient from close range (<2 m) for >2 minutes, the attack rate was 56%, 
whereas none of the 14 tourists who did not talk with the index case became ill. Members of the 
tour group who had talked with the index influenza case-patient for >10 minutes were almost 5 
times as likely to become ill than those who had talked with her for 2–9 minutes.18 
People may spend more time indoor together when weather is not good, such as cold or 
rainy days, this will increase contact rate among individuals. Graham et al. conducted a study 
using the US Environmental Protection Agency's Consolidated Human Activity Database 
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(CHAD) for various locations in the United States and demonstrated that individuals spend on 
average 51 - 86 more minutes indoors during cold weather and spend on average 36 minutes 
more time indoors during rainy weather.19  
• Virus survival 
Influenza virus can be transmitted through several modes including droplet, aerosols, and contact 
transmission (both direct and indirect contact). The virus must be able to survive in a variety of 
environmental conditions for effective transmission among hosts. Several conditions were 
considered as important factors related to virus survival and seasonality. The high level of 
humidity, high temperature, and solar radiation demonstrated decreasing of influenza virus 
survival.20-22 
Lowen et al. experimented the effect of temperature and relative humidity on aerosol 
transmission among guinea pigs. They found that aerosol spread of influenza virus was 
dependent upon both ambient relative humidity and temperature. The low relative humidities of 
20% - 35% were most favorable for transmission, while transmission was completely blocked at 
a high relative humidity of 80%. Furthermore, when guinea pigs were kept at 5°C, transmission 
occurred with greater frequency than at 20°C, while at 30°C, no transmission was detected.20 
These finding implicate low relative humidities produced by indoor heating and cold 
temperatures as features of winter that favor influenza virus spread. However, it is unlikely this 
finding can explain influenza seasonality in the tropics because those regions are typically humid 
year-round, and epidemics tend to occur during the rainy season, when humidity is typically at 
maximal levels. Lowen et al. also reported that the lack of aerosol transmission among guinea 
pigs at 30°C at all humidities and transmission via the contact route was equally efficient at 30°C 
and 20°C. This implies that contact or short-range spread predominates in the tropics and offers 
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an explanation for the lack of a well-defined, recurrent influenza season affecting tropical and 
subtropical regions.21                                      
 Sagripanti et al. calculated the expected inactivation of influenza A virus by solar 
ultraviolet radiation in several cities of the world during different times of the year. The 
inactivation rates indicated that influenza A virions should remain infectious after release from 
the host for several days during the winter “flu season” in many temperate-zone cities, with 
continued risk for human infection.22 This might explain increasing of influenza burden during 
seasons with reduced sun activity, such as winter season in temperate regions and rainy season in 
tropics. 
• Host immunity 
Evidence for seasonal triggers of host immunity suggesting that respiratory infections including 
influenza are more frequent in individuals with known vitamin D deficiencies.23 Human vitamin 
D levels are generally dependent upon exposure to solar radiation. Vitamin D deficiencies are 
common in temperate populations during the winter when solar radiation is lowest. Large 
seasonal variations in vitamin D levels have been found in some studies. Guillemant et al. found 
a difference between after summer and after winter 25-hydroxyvitamin D (25(OH)D) levels to be 
around 30 nmol/l in French male adolescents.24 Vieth et al. found an average difference between 
summer and winter 25(OH)D levels at 18 nmol/l in a study among Canadian women; and 
prevalence of vitamin D insufficiency was higher in winter time, especially among Asian 
ethnics.25 
One observational study has shown that individuals with lower vitamin D levels are 
significantly more likely to report respiratory infections. Ginde et al. performed a secondary 
analysis of the Third National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey (NHANES), a 
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probability survey of the US population conducted between 1988 and 1994. They examined the 
association between 25(OH)D levels and recent upper respiratory tract infections (URIs) in 
18,883 participants 12 years and older. They found that lower 25(OH)D levels were 
independently associated with recent URTI (compared with 25[OH]D levels of ≥30 ng/mL: odds 
ratio [OR], 1.36; 95% CI 1.01 to 1.84 for <10 ng/mL and 1.24; 1.07 to 1.43 for 10 to <30 
ng/mL).26 This association was supported by a recent clinical trial. Urashima et al. conducted a 
randomized control trial to test the effect of vitamin D supplementation on influenza A and B 
incidence in school children in Japan. The study indicated that the experimental group were 
significantly less likely to become infected with influenza A than the controls. Influenza A 
occurred in 18 of 167 (10.8%) children in the vitamin D group compared with 31 of 167 (18.6%) 
children in the placebo group [relative risk (RR), 0.58; 95% CI: 0.34 to 0.99; p = 0.04]. 
However, the incidences of influenza B and rapid influenza diagnostic test-negative influenza-
like illness were not significantly different between the vitamin D and placebo groups.27 Another 
randomized controlled trial found no benefit of vitamin D supplementation in decreasing the 
incidence or severity of symptomatic URTIs during winter. Li-Ng et al. conducted a control trial 
to determine whether vitamin D supplementation during the winter season prevents or decreases 
URI symptoms in 162 adults who were randomly assigned to receive 50 μg vitamin D3 (2000 
IU) daily or matching placebo for 12 weeks. A bi-weekly questionnaire was used to record the 
incidence and severity of URI symptoms. There was no difference in the incidence of URIs 
between the vitamin D and placebo groups (48 URIs vs. 50 URIs, respectively, p = 0.57). There 
was no difference in the duration or severity of URI symptoms between the vitamin D and 
placebo groups [5.4 ± 4.8 days vs. 5.3 ± 3.1 days, respectively, p = 0.86 (95% CI for the 
difference in duration −1.8 to 2.1)].28 
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1.2.2 Populations at risk for influenza transmission and disease burden 
• People who are at high risk of getting influenza illness 
The disease can affect all age groups; however, influenza infection is higher among young 
children and elderly.  
o Children 
 Attack rate and hospitalization of influenza are higher among pre-school and school-age 
children. Data collected using medical records identification confirm that younger children are at 
elevated risk of influenza hospitalization; especially to those under 2 years of age, and the 
highest risk is in children under age 6 months.29-32   
o People who live with or care for others who are high risk of contracting influenza, 
such as healthcare workers 
 Healthcare workers are at risk of acquiring influenza and spread the contagious influenza 
virus to patients under their care and can be key cause of outbreak in healthcare settings. This is 
particular troubling for many patients at high risk for inﬂuenza-related complications such as 
those who have chronic medical conditions. Cross-transmission of influenza infection from 
healthcare workers to patients has been described.33-36 
• People who are at high risk of developing serious complications if they get sick with 
influenza 
o Elderly 
 Influenza morbidity is also higher among elderly. Thompson et al. studied influenza-
associated hospitalizations in the United States and reported that persons 85 years or older had 
the highest rates of influenza-associated primary respiratory and circulatory hospitalizations 
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(1,194.9 per 100,000 persons), followed by children younger than 5 years (107.9 primary 
respiratory and circulatory hospitalizations per 100,000 persons).37  
 Similar incident pattern was observed in developing countries. Simmerman et al. 
analyzed data from identified all hospitalized pneumonia patients form a population-based 
surveillance system in 2 provinces of Thailand and reported the average annual incidence of 
influenza pneumonia was greatest in persons age 75 or older (375 per 100,000) and in children 
less than 5 years of age (236 per 100,000).38 The elderly suffer by far the highest serious illness 
from influenza. The influenza-associated mortality was highest in persons aged 65 years and 
older, who account for about 90% of deaths attributable to influenza.39,40  
o People who have certain medical conditions   
 Influenza also can make chronic diseases worse. These medical conditions include 
chronic lung diseases (such as chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD)), and heart disease 
(such as congenital heart disease, congestive heart failure and coronary artery disease), asthma, 
and endocrine disorders (such as diabetes mellitus (DM)). 
 When overall influenza attributable mortality is examined by comparing deaths above 
seasonal baseline in years of high influenza versus low influenza activity, ischemic heart disease 
account for 22.9% of the attributable excess mortality, COPD and other heart disease has been 
the cause of death in 13.8% and 9.1% respectively.41 A similar finding was reported in by Yap et 
al. who conducted a retrospective study to estimate excess hospital admissions for pneumonia, 
COPD, and heart failure during inﬂuenza seasons in Hong Kong. The adjusted rates of excess 
inﬂuenza-associated hospital admissions for the three diagnoses combined amounted to 58.5, 
20.0, 29.2, and 13.4 per 10,000 populations aged > 65 years in 1998, 1999, 2000, and 2001, 
respectively.42 
 11 
 Several studies have revealed an association between heart diseases and severe illness of 
influenza. de Roux et al. conducted a study among patients with viral community-acquired 
pneumonia (CAP) and found that patients with chronic heart failure have an increased risk of 
acquiring a viral CAP (OR 15.3; 95% CI 1.4 to 163; p = 0.024).43 This finding was similar with 
that of a study that found influenza caused a seasonal excess mortality in patients with 
underlying cardiac illness. In this study, influenza-attributable risk of acute cardiopulmonary 
hospitalizations and death was estimated at 10.3 (95%CI 5.9 to 14.7) comparing influenza season 
to peri-influenza season.44 
o Pregnant women 
 Pregnant women have an increased risk of influenza infection and complications and lead 
to increase medical visits and hospitalizations for influenza-related illness relative to women of 
the same age.44,45 
 A large study of women aged 15–44 years who were enrolled in the Tennessee Medicaid 
program during influenza seasons between 1974 and 1993 demonstrated that pregnancy 
increased the risk of hospitalization for pneumonia, influenza and cardiopulmonary conditions; 
the risk increased during the later stages of pregnancy.45 This study reported influenza-
attributable risks for hospitalization in comparable non-pregnant and postpartum women were 
1.91 (95%Cl 1.51 to 2.31) and 1.16 (95%Cl -0.09 to 2.42) per 10,000 women-months, 
respectively. A recent 13-year (1990–2002) population-based cohort study reported similar 
findings. The rate of hospital admissions because of respiratory illness in the third trimester 
among women without co-morbidities was 7.4 per 10,000 woman-months during the influenza 
season, compared with 5.4 and 3.1 per 10,000 woman-months during the peri-and non-influenza 
seasons respectively.46 
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1.3 INFLUENZA IN THAILAND 
1.3.1 Influenza surveillance in Thailand 
There are two major surveillance systems for influenza in Thailand. The first is an influenza 
cases surveillance conducted by the Bureau of Epidemiology (BoE), Thai Ministry of Public 
Health (MoPH). The second is an influenza virological surveillance conducted by the Thailand 
National Institute of Health (NIH), Thai MoPH. 
Influenza is one disease in the National Notifiable Disease Report named Report506. The 
surveillance of influenza is hospital-based passive surveillance, mostly is governmental 
hospitals. When a patient visits a healthcare facility for medical treatment and is diagnosed with 
influenza, disease surveillance officials collect information (demographic data, diagnosis, date of 
onset, hospitalization, etc) and enter the data into Notifiable Disease Report database. The 
electronic database is sent from each hospital in that province to the Provincial Health Office. 
Then, the data are merged and sent to the BoE. The responsible officials must report even 
suspected disease or syndrome without laboratory confirmation (the system allows for a later 
revised report after laboratory result become available). A strength of this system is that it is 
quick to detect abnormal events including emerging diseases and outbreaks. However, because 
testing for influenza infection is not routinely available, very few reported cases are ever 
confirmed in the laboratory. As a result, influenza reported cases tend to be influenza-like illness 
(ILI). Because the majority of ILI cases are not caused by influenza, the lack of laboratory 
confirmation for influenza cases could result in over-estimates of influenza infections. 
Influenza virological surveillance is a sentinel laboratory-surveillance in Thailand. The 
NIH participates in the WHO influenza laboratory network as a national influenza center by 
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conducting laboratory surveillance, subtyping viruses responsible for disease outbreaks, and 
contributing strain surveillance data. Clinical samples are submitted by ten participating hospitals 
from all 4 regions (North, Northeastern, Central and South) and 1 health center in Bangkok. 
These sentinel hospitals also must send influenza cases report to the National Notifiable Disease 
Report system. However, the responsible officials are laboratory officials and this is an 
independent surveillance system. If someone is laboratory positive on the virological 
surveillance system, and is notified to surveillance officials, the case will get into the Notifiable 
Disease Report database. 
1.3.2 Incidence of influenza in Thailand 
Thailand had reported influenza cases with incidence of 2.17 per 100,000 population in year 
1971. The incidence increased gradually and peaked between 1982-1989 (120.41-178.36 per 
100,000 population). Then, the reported cases have generally declined except for the epidemic 
between year 2009-2010, a result of pandemic novel influenza A (H1N1). During the pandemic 
the incidence was 189.72 and 180.82 per 100,000 population in year 2009 and 2010 respectively 
(Figure 1). 
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Source: Bureau of Epidemiology, Thailand MoPH 
Figure 1 Reported incidence of influenza per 100,000 population, Thailand 1971-2011 
 
Typically there is a peak of reported cases during the rainy season, between July-
September (around Week 30th - 40th), except in 2009 when the epidemic came early (Figure2). 
 
Source: Bureau of Epidemiology, Thailand MoPH 
Figure 2 Reported cases of influenza, by week of onset, Thailand 2007-2011 
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Before the pandemic years, influenza incidence was high among small children. In 2007, 
the highest incidence was found in age group 0-4 years old (54.16 per 100,000 population); 
followed by age group 5-9 years old (45.32 per 100,000 population), and age group 10-14 years 
old (34.43 per 100,000 population) respectively. In 2008, the highest incidence was found in age 
group 0-4 years old (61.92 per 100,000 population); followed by age group 5-9 years old (54.95 
per 100,000 population), and age group 10-14 years old (40.06 per 100,000 population) 
respectively (Figure 3). 
 
 
Source: Bureau of Epidemiology, Thailand MoPH 
Figure 3 Reported incidence of influenza per 100,000 population, by age group, Thailand 2007-
2008 
 
 During the pandemic years, influenza incidence shifted to older children in 2009 and 
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per 100,000 population), and age group 0-4 years old (438.46 per 100,000 population) 
respectively In 2010, the highest incidence was found in age group 0-4 years old (606.75 per 
100,000 population); followed by age group 5-9 years old (483.2 per 100,000 population), and 
age group 10-14 years old (281.33 per 100,000 population) respectively (Figure 4). 
 
 
Source: Bureau of Epidemiology, Thailand MoPH 
Figure 4 Reported incidence of influenza per 100,000 population, by age group, Thailand 2009-
2010 
 
 In 2009, Thai NIH received 3,052 clinical specimens from ILI patients, 638 (20.9%) had 
positive results. Of these, there was seasonal H1N1 88 specimens (13.79%), H3N2 80 specimens 
(12.54%), Flu B 78 specimens (12.23%), and pandemic H1N1 392 specimens (61.44%) 
(Figure5). 
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Source: Thai National Influenza Center, Thailand NIH 
Figure 5 Number of clinical specimens from ILI patients and test results, influenza virological 
surveillance, Thailand 2009 
 
In 2010, Thai NIH received 3,505 clinical specimens from ILI patients, 866 (24.7%) had 
positive results. Of these, there was H3N2 119 specimens (13.74%), Flu B 285 specimens 
(32.91%), pandemic H1N1 462 specimens (53.35%), seasonal H1N1 was not identified 
(Figure6). 
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Source: Thai National Influenza Center, Thailand NIH 
Figure 6 Number of clinical specimens from ILI patients and test results, influenza virological 
surveillance, Thailand 2010 
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1.4 INFECTIOUS DISEASE MODELING 
Mathematical models are being increasingly used to explain the transmission of infections and to 
evaluate the potential impact of control strategies in reducing morbidity and mortality. They can 
integrate epidemiological and biological data to give quantitative insights into patterns of disease 
spread and the effectiveness of interventions. Their application include predicting the impact of 
interventions against common diseases as well as determining optimal control strategies against 
emerging infectious diseases. Many models were used to make predictions about the likely 
outcome of alternative courses of public health interventions for global concerned diseases such 
as Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS), Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV), small 
pox, and influenza.47-49 
The model structure reflects the natural history of the infections. In this structure, 
population categories and diseases transitions need to be described. Individuals are classified 
according to theirs infection and immune status as either susceptible, exposed, infectious, or 
recovered. 
• Susceptible (S): Initially, individual is susceptible and can get infection if they are exposed to 
pathogen of infectious individuals.  
• Exposed (E): In early stages of infection, the infected individuals may not exhibit obvious 
signs of infection and pathogen may be too low to allow further transmission. Infected 
individuals are not yet infectious.  
• Infectious (I): At this stage, the infected individuals become infectious and can spread the 
disease to any susceptible individual that they come contact with. 
• Recovered (R): The individuals have recovered from the disease and no longer infectious 
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1.4.1 Epidemic dynamics 
The growth of an epidemic is principally governed by two factors: the basic reproduction number 
(R0) and generation time. R0 determines how intensive strategies will need to be to control the 
epidemic, whereas both R0 and generation time determine the time available to implement 
suitable control measures. 
1.4.1.1 Basic reproductive number (R0) 
This number quantifies the transmissibility of any pathogen, which is defined as the average 
number of secondary infectious persons resulting from one infectious person following their 
introduction into an entirely susceptible population. A disease can spread if R0 is greater than 
one, and the transmission will be inevitably die out if R0  is less than one. The goal of control 
policies is to reduce R0 to below one by eliminating a proportion 1 - 1/ R0 of transmission. This 
can be achieved in three ways:7  
• by reducing contact rates in the population such as social distance measures 
• by reducing the infectiousness of infected individuals such as treatment of isolation 
• by reducing the susceptibility of uninfected individuals such as vaccination or antiviral 
prophylaxis 
 The value of R0 is different for different infectious agents and depends among other 
things on the characteristics of the population that the agent invades. Given this, it is not 
immediate that one can adopt previously determined values or size ranges for an outbreak in a 
new population unless many of the complicated characteristics of, for example, population 
composition and contact structure are comparable.50 
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 Many modeling studies have estimated R0 either previous influenza pandemics or 
seasonal influenza. The estimated influenza R0 range from 1.2 to 3.75 (Table 1).51-59 
 
Table 1 Summary of influenza R0 estimation 
Authors Type Country Study year R0  
Chowell (2006) Pandemic 1918 Switzerland 
1918 (spring) 
1918 (fall) 
1.49 (95% CI 1.45 - 1.53) 
3.75 (95% CI 3.57 - 3.93) 
Mills (2004) Pandemic 1918 USA 1918 Median 2.0 (IQR 1.7 - 2.3) 
White (2008) Pandemic 1918 USA 1918 Range 1.34 - 3.21 
Massad (2007) Pandemic 1918 Brazil 1918 2.68 
Vynnycky(2008) Pandemic 1957 UK 1957 1.8 
Viboud (2006) Epidemic UK 1951 Range 1.9 - 2.5 
Lessler (2007) Outbreak USA 1976 1.2 (Range 1.1 - 1.4) 
Chowell (2008) Seasonal USA, Australia, 
France 
1972 - 1997 
 
1.3 (95% CI 1.2 - 1.4) 
Range 0.9 - 2.0 
Fraser (2009) 
Novel influenza 
A (H1N1) 
Mexico 2009 1.4 - 1.6 
1.4.1.2 Generation time 
Generation time (Tg) is the time form onset of such a primary to a secondary case. It is 
determined by the duration of the pre-infectious and infectious periods (which determine when 
infection leaves the primary case) as well as the incubation period (which determines when the 
secondary case has clinical onset). The generation time also referred to as the serial interval. 
Estimates of the serial interval of human influenza are incorporated into models of influenza as 
 22 
the generation time, which is formally defined as the average time interval between successive 
infections in a chain of transmission. Estimates of the mean serial interval range between 2 - 4 
days.57,60 
1.4.2 Models 
A models provides a convenient framework in which we can put all key factors together to make 
predictions of changes in the number of susceptible, infectious, and immune individuals and the 
likely number of cases by time of interests. There are two types of models to be considered, 
deterministic and stochastic. 
1.4.2.1 Deterministic model 
Deterministic models describe what happens, on average, in a population of interest. In these 
models, the input parameters (such as contact rate, rate of infection, duration of disease, or rate 
of recover, etc.) are fixed, and therefore the model's predictions (such as number of cases, 
number of recovery or immune) represent an average number over time.  
A commonly used deterministic model for epidemiological study, is the susceptible-
infectious-recovered (SIR) and susceptible-exposed-infectious-recovered (SEIR) compartmental 
model. This type of model categorize the host population to infection status as either susceptible, 
exposed, infectious, or recovered. Fundamental to the deterministic model are assumptions that 
all susceptible people in the population are equally at risk of infection from any infected 
individual (homogeneous mixing) and that all infected individuals have a constant and equal 
infectiousness.   
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Although compartmental SIR models have proven to be quite useful in modeling 
epidemics, they do not properly model some important aspects of disease spread. For example, 
assuming homogeneous mixing of the population is unrealistic. Individuals tend to make contact 
with household members, workplace colleagues and friends at a much higher rate than random 
strangers, and such regular contacts will also tend to be in the same geographic vicinity. Also, 
contact with infectious individuals is much higher at hospitals. One example of this limitation of 
assuming homogeneity; consider the 2002-2003 outbreak of SARS. Using a deterministic model 
to estimated R0 based on the initial outbreak of SARS would estimate a very high number of 
SARS patients, with cases numbering easily in the millions. However, the actual reported of 
SARS cases was much lower. This resulted from the estimation of R0 were based on data 
involving large numbers of transmission in hospitals, where people have usually high rate of 
contact.61  
1.4.2.2 Stochastic model 
Stochastic models allow the number of individuals who move between compartments to vary by 
chance. The input parameter may vary randomly. This is crucial when heterogeneity of key 
factors among population is expected. Also, most interventions are usually considered to be 
heterogeneous among population. Therefore, the stochastic models are more realistic than 
deterministic models. The model's prediction will give a range of output number over time. This 
feature of stochastic models is practical for decision-making purposes, for example, the range of 
number of cases (both no-intervention and intervention scenarios) is more helpful for planning 
purposes than the fixed average number of cases. 
The agent-based model is one type of stochastic model. Agent-based models keep track 
of what happens to every individual in a population and allowing chance to determine whether or 
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not an individual is infected. This approach is to draw a number at random for each individual, 
and to specify the range in which it the random value should lie for the individual to be 
considered as infected. If the number falls outside the range, then that individual remains 
susceptible. This range is based on the risk of infection at that time point. To calculate the 
outbreak size in a given population, the method would need to draw random numbers for each 
susceptible person, update the number of susceptible and infectious individuals based on the 
random number drawn, and repeat this process until there are no further infectious or susceptible 
individuals and transmission ceases. 
For many infectious diseases, transmission occurs mainly between people who are 
collocated (simultaneously in the same location), and spread is due mainly to people's 
movement. In addition, diseases often spread differently in different age groups, spread 
differently depending on the type of contact; for example, contacts at home tend to be more 
intimate than contacts at work. Also, disease spread is affected by geographic location and 
seasonality. Researchers have built very high-fidelity models using agent-based simulations, 
where each of these important characteristics is included in the model.7,62  
1.4.3 Influenza modeling 
The use of modeling and simulation for influenza is well recognized. Many models have been 
used to understand the transmission dynamics of influenza, find the optimal policies to minimize 
the mortality and morbidity of epidemic outbreaks, and as a health policy tool to predict the 
effect of public health interventions. 
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• Estimation of epidemiological parameters 
 Many modeling studies have investigated the past influenza epidemics and historical 
pandemics of the 20th century: the Spanish Flu 1918–1919 (H1N1) and Asian Flu 1957–1958 
(H2N2) and have consistently estimated that R0 was mostly in the range of 1.2–3 (Table 1).51-58  
• Assessing the effectiveness of biomedical and behavioral public health interventions 
 The potential effectiveness of antiviral agents have been modeled to assess their 
effectiveness and compare the relative effectiveness of prophylaxis versus treatment strategies  
(Table 2),7,8,63-66 and to assess the potential risk of antiviral resistance (Table 3).67-70 These 
studies consistently showed that targeting antiviral prophylaxis (that is, providing close contacts 
of suspected cases with antivirals) would be an efficient use of antiviral stockpiles in terms of 
reducing the epidemic size, compared with treatment-only strategies. These finding are crucial in 
decision making on the best use of country’s antiviral stockpiles. 
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Table 2 Studies model an effectiveness of antiviral agents 
Authors Type Findings 
Longini (2004) Treatment & 
prophylaxis 
Treating index case and prophylaxis of contacts reduce attack 
rate in the population from 33% to 2% 
Ferguson (2005) Prophylaxis • prophylaxis of an entire country or region should be able 
to eliminate a pandemic virus with an R0 > of 3.6  
• Social targeting prophylaxis that initiated after 20 or more 
cases, has a 90% probability of eliminating the pandemic 
strain if R0 < 1.25 
Longini (2005) Treatment & 
prophylaxis 
Treating index case and prophylaxis of contacts would have a 
high probability of containing influenza if   R0 < 1.25 
Ferguson (2006) Prophylaxis Antiviral prophylaxis of household members is effective in 
reducing cumulative attack rates by at least one-third and 
peak attack rates by a half 
van den Dool 
(2009) 
Prophylaxis Post-exposure and continuous prophylaxis reduced the patient 
infection attack rate from 0.19 to 0.13 and 0.05, respectively. 
McCaw (2007) Treatment & 
prophylaxis 
• Targeted post-exposure prophylaxis delays the onset of 
the pandemic  
• Treatment based strategy does not delay the onset of a 
pandemic, and is not capable of significantly reducing the 
attack rate from baseline 
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Table 3 Studies model a potential risk of antiviral resistance 
Authors 
Pattern of usage of 
antivirals 
Findings 
Furguson (2003) Treatment of 6% of 
symptomatic 
influenza infections 
Resistance will occur in 1.8% of the treated patients, or 
0.049% of all symptomatic influenza infections for the 
first 3 years after treatment is introduced in the 
population. 
Lipsitch (2007) Treatment of 30% of 
infected hosts, and/or 
prophylaxis of 30% 
of contacts 
Even if antiviral treatment or prophylaxis leads to the 
emergence of a transmissible resistant strain in as few 
as 1 in 50,000 treated persons and 1 in 500,000 
prophylaxed persons, widespread use of antivirals may 
promote the spread of resistant strains to a prevalence 
of tens of percent by the end of a pandemic 
McCaw (2008) Combined treatment 
(40%) and 
prophylaxis (30%) 
Strategies that combine treatment and prophylaxis are 
most effective at controlling transmission, at the cost 
of facilitating the spread of resistant viruses 
Arino (2009) 40% or 60% 
treatment level 
These treatment levels can result in a more rapid 
depletion of drug stockpiles, leading to run-out, by 
promoting wide-spread drug resistance 
 
 Vaccination is the long-term solution for reducing morbidity and mortality of influenza. 
A series of studied used mathematical modeling to assess the public health benefit of different 
vaccination strategies to optimize the use of a limited amount of vaccines (Table 4).71-74 Most 
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studies concluded that vaccinating school children would substantially reduce influenza 
transmission. 
Table 4 Studies model optimal vaccine distribution 
Authors Target population Findings 
Patel (2005) Age group: 0-4, 5-18, 19-
50, 51-64, 65+ years 
When there was only enough vaccine for 30% of 
the entire vaccination and the objective was to 
minimize illness, the optimal vaccination strategy 
involved concentrating vaccine in children, with 
the leftover vaccine going to middle aged adults 
Riley (2007) General population A lower (optimal) vaccine dose may be justified in 
order to increase population coverage, thereby 
reducing the infection attack rate overall 
Basta (2009) Children aged 6 months to 
18 years 
Vaccinating school-aged children against 
influenza can reduce age-specific and population-
level illness attack rates 
Lee (2010) Age group: 0-5 months, 6-
23 months, 2-4.9 years, 5-
18 years, 19-24 years, 25-
49 years, 50-64 year, 65+ 
years 
Optimal allocation is adherence to the Advisory 
Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP) 
prioritization recommendations for the H1N1 
influenza vaccine when vaccine is in limited 
supply and that within the ACIP groups, children 
should receive highest priority 
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 The effect of public health interventions such as closing schools, quarantining infected 
individuals or imposing travel restrictions also have been modeled (Table 5).7,8,64,75 The studies 
showed that that household quarantine, and prolonged school closures, could reduce the 
cumulative number of influenza cases. 
 
Table 5 Studies model an effectiveness of public health interventions 
Authors Interventions Findings 
Ferguson (2005) School and workplace 
closure (add on 
antiviral prophylaxis 
policy) 
Adding area-based school and workplace closure to a 
antiviral drug-sparing prophylaxis policy increases 
policy effectiveness significantly, with the combined 
policy having a 90% chance of elimination for R0 = 1.7 
Longini (2005) Quarantine (add on 
antiviral prophylaxis 
policy) 
Combination of 80% targeted antiviral prophylaxis and 
quarantine is effective at an R0 as high as 2.4 
Ferguson (2006) Case isolation Isolating 90% of influenza cases can reduce cumulative 
attack rates from 34% to 27% for R0 = 2.0 
Epstein (2007) International air travel 
restrictions 
95% travel restrictions can delay the initial spread of 
the epidemic, as measured by the number of cases after 
6 months 
 
 Most of influenza modeling studies utilized compartmental models; however, some of the 
more recent studies conducted utilize agent-based simulation models.6-8,64,74,76,77 Agent-based 
simulations can easily take into account household demographics, individually targeted 
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interventions and spatial heterogeneity which are often difficult simulate using compartmental 
models. However, it needs intensive computer resources and take times to run the models, 
especially for a large-scaled simulation. 
1.4.4 Influenza modeling in Thailand 
To date, a few influenza models using Thailand data have been published.7,64,78 The first one was 
conducted by Ferguson et al. which used agent-based models to simulate disease burden and 
effect of various control strategies at national scale. They assumed that a H5N1 pandemic 
influenza would occurred by re-assortment of avian virus and human virus, generating a virus 
with increased transmissibility. They seeded simulations with a single infection in the most rural 
third of the population (that is, with the lowest population density), assuming that rural 
populations are most likely to be exposed to the avian virus. This assumption is unrealistic if a 
new pandemic influenza originate from human influenza, which often start with crowded 
population. They simulated impact of targeted mass prophylactic use of antiviral drugs and 
reinforcements of other interventions aimed at reducing population contact rates to an antiviral-
based containment policy. They reported that elimination of a pandemic may be feasible using a 
combination of geographically targeted prophylaxis and social distancing measures (school and 
workplace closure, quarantine zones in which movements in and out of the affected area are 
restricted). If the R0 of the new virus is below 1.8, they predicted that a stockpile of 3 million 
courses of antiviral drugs should be sufficient for elimination. 
 The second study was conducted by Longini et al. They used a discrete-time stochastic 
simulation model of influenza spread within a structured geographically distributed population of 
500,000 people to compare the effectiveness of various intervention strategies (antiviral 
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prophylaxis, H5N1 influenza vaccine, case quarantine) against a new strain of influenza that may 
originate from avian influenza. This study aimed to model effectiveness of those interventions 
only. Like the first study, this study is based on rural area context and was small scale model. 
This may not fit to a new pandemic influenza originate from human influenza. They reported that 
If the R0 is below 1.8, an antiviral agent stockpile on the order of 100,000 to 1 million courses for 
treatment and prophylaxis would be sufficient to contain the outbreak. If pre-vaccination 
occurred, then targeted antiviral prophylaxis could be effective for containing strains with 
an R0 as high as 2.1. Combinations of targeted antiviral prophylaxis, pre-vaccination, and 
quarantine could contain strains with an R0 as high as 2.4. 
 The third study was conducted by Krumkamp et al. who used a deterministic SEIR model 
without age structure assuming a homogeneously mixing population at 2 provinces of Thailand 
to assess health resource gap for influenza treatment in a novel influenza A (H1N1) scenario. 
This study did not cover aspect of disease prevention and control. Also, assuming a 
homogeneously mixing population might not be true, especially for intervention policy and 
control strategies. They found the differences in health outcomes between a province with 
adequate resources and a province with potential resource gaps. The province with adequate 
resources had adequate hospital beds and medical ventilators for the outbreak response.  Also the 
antiviral drugs stockpile was sufficient to treat all critical cases. However, the surplus did not 
allow for changing treatment strategies to provide to outpatients who had mild symptoms. For 
another province with resource gap, medical ventilators need to be increased by 27.3% of the 
number current available, and antiviral drugs stockpile must be more than doubled in order to 
treat all hospitalized influenza cases. 
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1.4.5 The Framework for Reconstructing Epidemic Dynamics (FRED) 
In this study, a large-scale agent-based framework of infectious diseases, namely FRED and 
developed by the University of Pittsburgh Public Health Dynamics Laboratory (PHDL) in 
collaboration with the Pittsburgh Supercomputing Center (PSC) and the School of Computer 
Science at Carnegie Mellon University, was used. FRED is a freely available open-source 
epidemic modeling system that uses census-based synthetic populations to capture the 
demographic and geographic heterogeneities of the population, including realistic household, 
school, and workplace social networks.79 Mitigation strategies in the framework include 
vaccination, anti-viral drugs, and school closure policies. FRED models are currently available 
for every state and county in the United States, and selected international locations. Public health 
planners can use FRED to explore the possible influenza epidemics and to help evaluate the 
likely effect of interventions. 
FRED was designed as a flexible framework for epidemic modeling. While originally 
designed to study influenza, FRED can be adapted to other infectious diseases, by modifying 
configuration files characterizing the natural history of the disease. Other user-modifiable 
parameters include the initial immunological profile of the population, the availability and 
efficacy of vaccine and anti-viral drugs, and a flexible set of intervention policies regarding 
vaccine distribution, school closures and other non-pharmaceutical interventions.  Disease 
parameters and assumptions followed the process described in study by Cooley et al.80 and 
systematic review of Zhou et al.81 
PHDL made significant additions to FRED (FRED/Thailand) to support particular 
simulations that were not available in existing FRED. These contributions included the addition 
of (1) hospital assignments for workplace, (2) identification of healthcare workers (HCWs), (3) 
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chronic medical conditions and pregnancy assignments for agents (4) hospital preference 
assignments for agents, (5) temporary hospitalization of agents, (6) face mask behaviors, (7) 
hand washing behavior; and getting FRED/Thailand to run efficiently on Blacklight at PSC. 
1.4.6 Synthetic population 
FRED explicitly represents every individual living in a specific geographic region. However, 
Thailand synthetic population was not available in existing synthetic population database of the 
Research Triangle Institute (RTI International). The investigators in this study in collaboration 
with RTI International had developed a new Thailand synthetic population. The synthetic 
population used an iterative fitting method82 to generate an agent population from the aggregated 
census data. Thai census data (year 2000) on household size and age distributions were used to 
generate the synthesized agents and households. 
School and workplace assignments followed the methods described by Cajka et al.83 
School data (year 2011) from the Thai Ministry of Education84 on ≈38,000 schools were used to 
determine the distribution of school sizes, number and proportions of children in school as a 
function of age for school assignment. The schools assignment method was based on the 
assumption that students are enrolled at the closest school having adequate capacity. Data of 
Thailand Industrial census in year 200785 were used for workplace assignment. The data 
indicated numbers and percentages of workers by size of work place (1 - 15, 16 - 25, 26 - 30, 31 
- 50, 51 - 200, and >200 workers). The locations (point) of workplaces were generated. Then, 
each non-school age synthetic individual was assigned to a workplace such that the distribution 
and capacity of each workplace was appropriate. 
 34 
As original synthetic population did not have hospital assignment, the investigators in 
this study in collaboration with PHDL had created synthetic hospitals. The actual hospitals data 
of Thailand Ministry of Public Health in year 201386 were used to create synthetic hospitals. The 
method assumed that the number of HCWs who interact with patients was proportional to the 
number of beds by the value of 1 to 1 (e.g. a hospital with 100 beds would have 100 HCWs who 
interact with patients). The simulation then found a synthetic workplace with approximately the 
same number of employees and moved the assigned employees to work in the hospital as HCWs. 
To determine which hospital a family will visit, the method used a gravity model where the 
probability of going to a given hospital was determined by the (number of beds) / (distance from 
household to hospital)^2. 
Each agent has associated with its demographic information (e.g., age, sex, etc.), health 
information (e.g., current health status, date of infection, level of symptoms, infectiousness, 
susceptibility, etc.), location for social activity (e.g., household, neighborhood, school or 
workplace, etc.), and health-related behaviors (e.g., probability of staying home when sick, 
probability of getting a vaccine, etc.). 
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1.5 INFLUENZA CONTROL MEASURES 
Influenza control measures have goal to reduce the viral transmission, minimize morbidity and 
mortality. These interventions include influenza vaccines, antiviral agents, and non-
pharmaceutical interventions. 
1.5.1 Influenza vaccines 
Vaccination is at present the primary public health intervention for the reduction of disease 
seasonal influenza. Vaccines protect against influenza by stimulating an antigen-specific immune 
response in recipients. However, the antigens contained in the vaccine must match those of the 
circulating virus to be effective at reducing influenza infection. So far, development of vaccine 
against a specific type of influenza virus and its production requires several months. As a result, 
if a vaccine does not match a circulating strain, it would take months to produce the new vaccine, 
and the peak will likely have passed when the vaccine is available. 
 Vaccination has both direct and indirect effects. Direct effects occur because the person 
who is vaccinated may have reduced risk of becoming infected. Indirect effects occur because 
someone who is vaccinated will have reduced risk of spreading the pathogen to others (in part 
because they have a reduced risk of becoming infected). Close contacts of this vaccinated person 
will therefore also have reduced risk of becoming infected even if they do not receive vaccine 
themselves. 
 Two types of influenza vaccines are available: trivalent inactivated influenza vaccines 
(TIV) and live attenuated influenza virus vaccine (LAIV).  
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 The TTV vaccines are available for use among adults of all ages regardless of underlying 
medical conditions.  Efficacy is from 70 to 90% in healthy adults younger than 65 years of age 
and 30–90% in children, with lower efficacy in younger children.87 The LAIV is approved for 
use among healthy, non-pregnant adults through the age of 49. Efficacy is usually from 70% to 
90%.87  
These vaccine efficacy estimates are based on clinical trials, and usually be common 
lower efficacy in real world situations. Many factors may affect its efficacy. The vaccine is most 
effective if it contains a same antigenic strain with circulating influenza virus. However, there 
are yearly variability of influenza viral strains and vaccine manufacturing has about 1 year lag to 
justify vaccine antigenic strains and production. This does not assure that the current vaccine will 
contains exactly the same strains with current circulating virus. In addition, vaccine effectiveness 
in a population also depends on vaccine cold-chain and administration. Vaccines are 
temperature-sensitive biological products. The degradation rate of a vaccine is determined by the 
storage temperature: the higher the temperature, the more rapid and extensive is the degradation 
88. Influenza vaccine should be stored in the refrigerator at 35° to 46°F (2° to 8°C), aim for 40°F 
(4°C), and should not be frozen.  
1.5.2 Antiviral agents 
There are two classes of antiviral agents approved for the treatment and prophylaxis of influenza 
infections. The first class is M2 ion channel blockers; include Adamantanes, Amantadine and 
Rimantadine. The second class is neuraminidase inhibitors; include Oseltamivir and Zanamivir. 
For treatment purpose, both classes of drugs need to be administered within 48 hours of 
symptom onset to be effective.  
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 Amantadine and Rimantadine should no longer be used for the treatment of influenza due 
to the high incidence of resistance. Resistance to Amantadine and Rimantadine is seen with a 
frequency of ≥50% in children,36,89  the elderly and in immunocompromised patients.90,91 
Oseltamivir is the best choice for stockpiling given its efficacy,92,93 even with some degree of 
resistance.69 
 Guidelines regarding antiviral drugs use are necessary because there is only a limited 
supply of drugs during a pandemic or epidemic. Government stockpile policies are designated 
primarily for treatment. 
1.5.3 Non-pharmaceutical interventions 
Various non-pharmaceutical intervention strategies are a first line of defense against outbreak of 
infectious diseases because they can be implemented rapidly. These types of interventions seek 
to reduce the contacts between individuals or disrupt a spread of pathogen. The interventions 
have include strategies such as social distancing measures (such as closing schools and childcare 
centers, closure of public places, limit mass transit, isolation and quarantine), and personal 
protection and hygiene measures (such as mask wearing and hand washing). 
1.5.3.1 School closure 
The rationale for school closure is that children are thought to be important vectors of 
transmission and more infectious, are more susceptible to most influenza strains than adults, and 
the high contact rates in schools favor transmission. School closure is associated with decreased 
morbidity from respiratory tract infections94 including influenza.95 It has been proposed as a 
method of reducing both the total number of influenza cases and peak of attack rate during 
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pandemic.96 Epidemiological study using diseases surveillance data suggested that school 
holidays prevent 16–18% of seasonal influenza cases (18–21% in children); prolonged school 
closure during a pandemic might reduce the cumulative number of cases by 13–17% (18–23% in 
children) and peak attack rates by up to 39–45% (47–52% in children).97 However, school 
closures result in significant economic impacts because caregivers have to leave the workforce to 
care for unattended-school children.98,99 This make the school closure policy has a community 
controversial. 
1.5.3.2 Isolation and quarantine 
Isolation of the sick and quarantine of contacts measured in 1918 pandemic influenza was 
ineffective.100 After physicians reported influenza case, the patients were quarantined and their 
houses were placarded. Many citizens regarded the placard as an injustice and avoided 
quarantine. Also, many physicians hesitated to report mild symptom patients as influenza case. 
This made quarantine measure ineffective.  
 Some of the lessons learned from the 2003 SARS epidemic can be applied to influenza; 
early isolation of patients and quarantine of contacts successfully interrupted SARS transmission. 
Influenza has a serial interval of 2 to 4 days and infectivity is maximal early in illness, whereas 
for SARS the serial interval is 8–10 days and infectivity peaks during week 2 of illness. These 
factors allow little time for instituting the isolation and quarantine interventions that were 
essential in controlling SARS.101 However, Miyaki et al. conducted a study to evaluate 
quarantine measure for workplaces; asking workers whose family members developed an 
influenza-like illness (ILI) to stay at home voluntarily until 5 days had passed since the 
resolution of ILI symptoms or 2 days after alleviation of fever (The company paid full wages 
during this time). With 100% compliance to intervention, the waiting on full pay policy in the 
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workplace reduced the overall risk of influenza A H1N1 by about 20% in one influenza 
season.102 
1.5.3.3 Personal protection and hygiene measures 
Experience from previous influenza pandemic showed that wearing mask in public was 
ineffective. During the 1918 influenza pandemic, mask use was common and even required by 
law in many jurisdictions. However, the medical officer of health for Alberta, Canada, reported 
that cases of disease continued to increase after mask use was mandated.100  Recently, a limited 
controlled study evaluated the efficacy of wearing mask in preventing transmission of influenza 
virus was initiated and results have yet to be published.  
 During the SARS epidemic in 2003, surveys conducted in Hong Kong between April and 
May 2003 showed that most of the population wore a face mask (76%). In this period, influenza 
virus isolation rates decreased. However, since multiple hygienic measures were implemented 
(such as hand washing, covered their mouths when sneezing or coughing, used diluted bleach for 
household cleaning), the contribution of mask wearing was unclear.103 MacIntyre et al. 
conducted a prospective cluster-randomized trial comparing surgical masks, non-fit-tested P2 
masks, and no masks in prevention of influenza-like illness (ILI) among household members of 
ILI patients. They reported that adherent use of P2 or surgical masks significantly reduces the 
risk for ILI infection, with a hazard ratio equal to 0.26 (95% CI 0.09 to 0.77; p = 0.015).104 
Effectiveness of face mask use by index influenza cases was questionable in one study. Canini et 
al. conducted a cluster randomized intervention trial to evaluate the effectiveness of face mask 
use by index cases for limiting influenza transmission by large droplets produced during 
coughing in households. The result did not show any significant difference in ILI proportion 
among household contacts between the intervention arm and the control arm, even with a good 
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adherence to the intervention.  The multivariable adjusted odds ratio for the intervention arm 
compared  to the control arm was 0.95 (95%CI 0.44 to 2.05, p = 0.90).105  
 Many controlled studies have shown a protective effect of hand hygiene in reducing 
upper respiratory infections.106-112 Luby et al. conducted a randomized controlled trial to assess 
the effect of hand washing promotion with soap on the incidence of acute respiratory infection 
and found that children younger than 5 years in households that received plain soap and hand 
washing promotion had a 50% lower incidence of pneumonia than controls (95% CI 34% to 
65%).107 Mater et al. evaluated the effect of a scheduled hand-washing program in elementary 
school children on absenteeism due to acute communicable illness and found that respiratory 
illness was reduced at 21%(95%CI 0.02% to 0.39%).110 Talaat et al. studied the effectiveness of 
an intensive hand hygiene campaign (washing hands using soap and water at least twice during 
the school day for ≈45 seconds, followed by proper rinsing and drying with a clean cloth towel) 
on reducing absenteeism caused by ILI and laboratory-confirmed influenza and reported that 
overall absences caused by ILI and laboratory-confirmed influenza were reduced by 40% and 
50%, respectively (p<0.0001 for each illness).111 Stebbins et al. conducted a cluster-randomized 
trial in 10 elementary schools to assess efficacy of respiratory hygiene education and the regular 
use of hand sanitizer to reduce the laboratory-confirmed influenza. The interventions did not 
reduce total laboratory-confirmed influenza (A and B). However, the interventions did reduce 
school total absence episodes by 26% and laboratory-confirmed influenza A infections by 
52%.112 
 In contrast, some studies showed no protective effect of face mask use alone or hand 
washing alone on ILI or influenza, but revealed effectiveness of both interventions 
combined.113,114 Aiello et al. observed significant reductions in ILI during weeks 4–6 in the mask 
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and hand hygiene group, compared with the control group, ranging from 35% (95%CI 9% to 
53%) to 51% (95%CI 13% to 73%), after adjusting for vaccination and other covariates. 
However, adherence to the interventions varied and there was contamination between groups, 
with noncompliance in the intervention group and some practicing the intervention in the control 
group.113 Cowling et al. reported that effect attributable to fewer infections among participants 
using facemasks plus hand hygiene was OR= 0.33 (95%CI 0.13 to 0.87).114 
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1.6 SUMMARY 
There are 3 types of influenza virus: A, B and C. Only influenza A is associated with widespread 
epidemics and pandemics. Influenza is generally seasonal in temperate climate zones but is less 
pronounced in tropical zones. Mechanisms contribute to influenza seasonality remain unclear. 
Some mechanisms have been proposed to explain the seasonality including contact rates, virus 
survival, and host immunity. Populations at risk for influenza are children, elderly, healthcare 
workers, people with chronic medical conditions, and pregnant women. 
Mathematical and computational simulation models are being increasingly used to 
estimated a burden and evaluate impact of control strategies of influenza. One important disease 
transmission parameter is R0. However, this number was often estimated using developed 
countries data. 
Most models of influenza utilize compartmental models. A few studies have used agent-
based simulation models than can take into account heterogeneity in population.  
Several control measures can be implemented to prevent and control influenza. These 
intervention include vaccination, antiviral treatment and prophylaxis, non-pharmaceutical 
interventions (such as school closure, isolation, face mask wearing, and hand washing). 
Vaccination and antiviral prophylaxis have clear evidences of their efficacy, but has resource 
limitations on large-scale use in developing country like Thailand. Optimal influenza vaccine 
allocation simulations showed great benefit if is prioritized to children and elderly. However, 
there is no model assessing impact of vaccine prioritization to other risk population such as 
healthcare workers and people with chronic medical conditions. Some non-pharmaceutical 
interventions such as school closure and case isolation were often assessed for their impact and 
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have agreement on their effectiveness. However, a few study assess impact of face mask wearing 
and hand washing.  
There are some questions need to be answered: what is R0 estimate base on Thai 
population's context, how vaccine allocation policy affect influenza burden if it is prioritized to 
other risk population (healthcare workers and people with chronic medical conditions), are face 
mask wearing and hand washing effective on influenza control. 
This study used agent-based model to estimated influenza burden in Thailand and assess 
impact of vaccine allocation policy and non-pharmaceutical interventions (mask wearing and 
hand washing). This study did not simulate effect of antiviral prophylaxis as this is not Thailand 
policy and its effectiveness was well documentation in other model studies.  
The FRED was used to run simulation on Blacklight at PSC. A new synthetic Thai 
population with hospital assignment was developed for this study. 
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2.1 ABSTRACT 
Many studies of influenza modeling have estimated basic reproductive number (R0) using 
previous influenza pandemics in developed countries. The R0 based on Thailand's context is 
unknown and should be estimated for further studies of influenza dynamics and burden which 
may lead to better health resources allocation. Numbers of influenza case by week were obtained 
to estimate epidemic growth rate (r). The R0 was estimated using formula relating the r and 
generation time. The projection of influenza burden was studied by fitting an agent-based 
computer simulation model. The model containing a 58,354,744 synthetic Thai population. At 
start, 100 agents were randomly assigned for initial infection. The model simulated the 
interactions of individuals with others at household, school and workplace over 120 days. The R0 
estimates ranged from 1.11 to 1.77 (median 1.39).  For a R0 = 1.4 and no any intervention, the 
overall attack rate was estimated to be 49.9% (symptomatic attack rate 33.4%). Incidence rates 
began rising at week 4th (0.05%), peaked at week 9th (10.5%), and subsided at week 17th 
(0.05%). During the same period simulation, Thailand had reported influenza cases with attack 
rate 0.04%. For R0s equal 1.2, 1.6, 1.8 and 2.0; overall attack rates were 37.1%, 58.8%, 65.9%, 
and 71.7% respectively. The estimated Thailand R0 is comparable to R0 of developed countries. 
The results reveal that Thailand's surveillance report may have underestimated influenza's 
incidence. Effective control measures should be taken place within the first two weeks of 
outbreak to minimize number of cases. 
 
Key words: Reproductive number, Influenza, Thailand, Computer simulation 
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2.2 INTRODUCTION 
The important parameters for understanding disease transmission are the basic reproductive 
number (R0) and serial interval.115 The R0 is defined as the average number of secondary 
infections created from a primary infection in an entirely susceptible population. If R0 is greater 
than one, the disease has the potential to spread. If it is less than one, the disease will die out 
after only a few generations. The next influenza pandemic will start when a novel strain of 
influenza evolves with R0 > 1 in humans. Control strategies are typically targeted to drive this 
number below one and maintain it there, as this will lead to eventual extinction of the epidemic. 
 Many modeling studies have estimated R0 either from previous influenza pandemics or 
seasonal influenza. The estimated influenza R0 range from 1.2 to 3.75.51-59 Most of these studied 
used epidemiologic data from previous influenza pandemic years. However, the R0 in seasonal 
years is relatively scarce.   In addition, even when the information is available the most common 
countries studied were developed countries such as Switzerland, USA, England and Canada.51-
53,56,57 There have been  a few studies about the transmissibility in developing countries, one in 
Brazil,54 another in Mexico.59 There is limited knowledge of R0 in developing countries in Asia 
including Thailand.  
 Thailand may have difference social contacts and lifestyles compare to developed 
countries, or developing countries in South America. The R0 based on Thailand's context should 
be estimated and used to further studies of influenza dynamics and control strategies.  
In the case of seasonal influenza, it is less likely that people are entirely susceptible. A 
fraction of individuals may be effectively protected against infection, because of residual 
immunity from previous exposure to influenza or vaccination. So, a more practical quantity is an 
effective reproductive number (Rt), which is defined as the number of secondary infections that 
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arise from a typical primary case. Nevertheless, Rt can be approximate to R0, especially when a 
proportion of immune individual is small. 
 The government of Thailand needs to understand the role of influenza in Thailand for 
policy planning purposes. Thailand-specific influenza R0 can be used to estimate burden of 
influenza. This may lead to better health resources allocation and influenza preparedness.  
 This study will focus at human influenza strains that spread widely. We aim to estimate 
Rt of seasonal influenza, and model influenza to address the burden of disease in Thailand. 
2.3 METHODS 
2.3.1 Influenza Rt estimation 
Influenza cases surveillance of the National Notifiable Disease Report was used to obtain 
influenza incidence. Bangkok, the capital city of Thailand, was selected as a sample for influenza 
incidence because there were outbreak every year and is a high risk area to spread influenza to 
other provinces. Bangkok is the biggest tourist city in Thailand and has crowded population. 
Bangkok has 5.6 million population. Approximately 36 million tourists (both Thais and 
foreigners) annually travel to Bangkok.   
 The numbers of influenza cases by week from 2003 to 2012 were obtained.  An epidemic 
curve with logarithm scale for each year was plotted. Linear increase in cases on a logarithmic 
scale indicates exponential increase in the number of cases. The epidemic growth rate (r) was 
estimated during this exponential growth phase using the formula relating the number of cases(I) 
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at two time points t1 (start) and t2 (stop) of the growth phase. The calculated r per week was 
divided by 7 to obtain daily value. 
𝑟𝑟 =  1
𝑡𝑡2 − 𝑡𝑡1
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 �
𝐼𝐼(𝑡𝑡2)
𝐼𝐼(𝑡𝑡1)� 
 The generation time (Tg) was estimated at 2.6 days.7 The Rt was estimated using formula 
relating the epidemic growth rate and generation time.7,116  
𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡 = 1 + 𝑟𝑟𝑇𝑇𝑔𝑔 
2.3.2 Modeling influenza burden of Thailand 
Synthetic population data 
A synthetic population (with school and workplace assignments) of Thailand was developed by 
the Research Triangle Institute (RTI International).83 In summary, RTI International used a 
proportional iterative method82 to generate an agent population from aggregated census data. 
Thai census data (year 2000) on household size and age distributions were used to generate the 
synthesized agents and households. Each agent had a set of socio-demographic characteristics 
that included age, sex, employment status, occupation, and household location. School data (year 
2011) from the Thai Ministry of Education84 on ≈38,000 schools were used to determine the 
distribution of school sizes, number and proportions of children in school as a function of age for 
school assignment. The schools assignment method was based on the assumption that students 
are enrolled at the closest school having adequate capacity. Data of Thailand Industrial census in 
year 200785 were used for workplace assignment. The data indicated numbers and percentages of 
workers by size of work place (1 - 15, 16 - 25, 26 - 30, 31 - 50, 51 - 200, and >200 workers). The 
locations (point) of workplaces were generated. Then, each non-school age synthetic individual 
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was assigned to a workplace such that the distribution and capacity of each workplace was 
appropriate. Agents move among their households, assigned workplaces (for employed adults), 
schools (for school-aged children) and various locations in the community, where they interact 
with other agents who were household members, workplace mate, and classmate. 
Disease and model parameterization 
Disease parameters and assumptions follow the process described in a study by Cooley et al.80 
and systematic review of Zhou et al.81 Individuals are classified according to their infection and 
immune status as either susceptible (S), latent or exposed (E), infectious (I), or recovered (R). 
All individuals are initially susceptible to influenza until infectious individuals are introduced 
into the model. Each newly infected individual enter a latent state. During this time, the agent is 
infected but not yet infectious to others. We assume that infectiousness and symptoms begin at 
the same time as the viruses are shed via droplets produced when infected people cough or 
sneeze. Thus latent period (the time from infection to when a host is able to transmit the 
pathogen) was approximate to incubation period. Then, the agent moves to the infectious state, in 
which the agent may infect others. Two-third of infected individuals develop symptoms.64,76,117 
Finally, the individual enters the recovered state and remains immune to subsequent infections. 
 The projection of influenza burden was studied by fitting an agent-based computer 
simulation model (ABM). This study used a Framework for Reconstructing Epidemiological 
Dynamics (FRED) for modeling. FRED is an open source, modeling system developed by the 
University of Pittsburgh Public Health Dynamics Laboratory in collaboration with the Pittsburgh 
Supercomputing Center (PSU) and the School of Computer Science at Carnegie Mellon 
University.79 The model is a stochastic, spatially structured, individual-based discrete time 
simulation. Individuals are co-located in households, with households being constructed to 
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reflect typical generational structure while matching empirical distributions of age structure and 
household size for Thailand. 
 The probability that an infected individual transmits influenza to susceptible persons 
depended on the rate of potentially infectious contacts, and the probability per contact of 
transmitting influenza. Every susceptible individual who contacts an infectious individuals had a 
probability of disease transmission (per contact), derived from prior studies of the 1957–1958 
Asian influenza pandemic.7,64,76 As in Cooley et al.80, we assumed that 50% of sick individual 
stay at home and do not interact with any agents outside of the household. Additionally, we 
assume that all community contacts increase by 50% on weekends. The model was calibrated 
using the Ferguson et al. approach from historical (1957–1958, 1968–1969) influenza 
pandemics.7 We specifically used the 30–70 rule developed in which 30% of all transmission 
occurred in the household and 70% of all transmission occurred outside the household (33% in 
the general community, and 37% in schools and workplaces).7 The strategy was to estimate mean 
contact rate per day at each location that produced and epidemic that satisfied the 30-70 rule 
calibration criteria. To achieve this rule, within household contacts were treated differently than 
other locations. We assumed that each pair of agents within a household make contact each day 
with a specified probability. This probability is tunes as part of the calibration step to achieve the 
30-70 target distribution. At the start of each simulation, 100 agents were randomly assigned for 
initial infection. The individuals interact daily with others in the same household, school and 
workplace with a fixed mean number of people that they contact per day (from calibration step). 
The simulations were run over 120 days. Each presented result is the average of 10 simulation 
runs for one experiment (one R0 value).  
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Computational specifics 
Simulations were performed on Blacklight at PSU. Blacklight is an SGI servers, clusters and 
supercomputers, shared-memory system comprising 256 blades. Each blade holds 2 Intel Xeon 
X7560 (Nehalem) eight-core processors, for a total of 4096 cores across the whole machine. 
Each core has a clock rate of 2.27 GHz. Each experiment (10 simulation runs in parallel) is run 
using parallel computing over 16 computer nodes, taking an average of 3.5 hours on each 
experiment (17.5 hours of total computer time). 
2.4 RESULT 
2.4.1  Influenza Rt estimation 
From 2003 to 2012 influenza incidence throughout the year with multiple peaks between year 
2003 - 2008 and observed prominent peak between year 2009 – 2012 were reported in Bangkok.  
The number of reported cases by year ranged from 914 cases in year 2003 to 4,195 cases in 
2008. The reported cases increased to 19,185 and 22,387 cases in year 2009 and 2010, 
respectively. The number of cases declined slightly to 14,335 and 16,639 cases in year 2011 and 
2012, respectively. The highest incidence was usually identified during the rainy season (June to 
September). Epidemic curves were ploted to identify the highest linear increase in cases on a 
logarithmic scale. The annual epidemic growth rates ranged from 0.042 to 0.297 per day and the 
annual Rt estimations ranged from 1.11 to 1.77 (median 1.39) (Table 6). If data between year 
2010 - 2012 were excluded, The Rt estimations ranged from 1.3 to 1.77 (median 1.49). Based on 
 52 
these Rt values with median 1.39 and Rt can be approximate to R0, R0 was estimated to 1.4 for 
further influenza modeling. 
2.4.2 Modeling influenza burden of Thailand 
A synthetic population size of 58,354,744 was created to represent Thai population. We 
considered the scenario that no any intervention to control influenza transmission and assume 
influenza R0 = 1.4. When 100 randomly infected individuals were introduced, incidence of 
infection gradually increased and peaked on day 59 (Figure 7). At the end of day 120, there were 
29,120,708 cumulative new infected individuals. The overall attack rate was estimated to be 
49.9% (Figure 8). Of all infection, 19,509,482 infected individuals were symptomatic case. 
Symptomatic attack rate was 33.4%.  The simulation showed that 56.1% of infected individuals 
were adult, followed by children age <12 years old (24.7%), adolescent age 12-18 years old 
(14.7%) and elderly (4.5%) respectively. Incidence by week ranged from 0.55 to 11,118.11 per 
100,000 population (Table 7). Incidence rates began rising at week 4 (0.05%), peaked at week 9 
(10.5%), and subsided at week 17 (0.05%) (Figure 9). 
We compared the influenza incidence of the simulation study to reported influenza case 
from the Thailand Notifiable Disease Report. The report is hospital-based passive surveillance; 
mostly is governmental hospitals, clinical diagnosis with some laboratory confirmation. During 
the same period simulation, Thailand had reported influenza cases with attack rate 0.04%, while 
the simulation showed symptomatic attack rate was 33.4%. 
 Accounting for uncertainty of R0, we modeled influenza incidence with R0 ranged 1.2 - 
2.0. The higher R0, the higher overall attack rate. For R0s equal 1.2, 1.4, 1.6, 1.8 and 2.0; overall 
attack rates were 37.1%, 49.9%, 58.8%, 65.9%, and 71.7% respectively. The lowest R0 (1.2), 
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attack rate began rising at week 5 and peaked at the end of simulation, week 17. For R0 between 
2.0 and 1.6, attack rate began rising around week 2 - 3 and peaked around week 6 - 8 (Figure 10). 
2.5 DISCUSSION 
It is known that Rt is always less than R0 because not everyone is susceptible at beginning of 
outbreak due to a vaccination or prior infection. However, protective immunity to influenza virus 
often decline after vaccination or infection. The immunity is quite strain specific, but influenza 
viruses are constantly changing. In addition, influenza vaccine was not widely used in Thailand 
before 2010. So, Rt should be properly approximate to R0. Rt median in this study is based on 
situation that no or low level of immunity in population, similar to other pandemic R0. 
Rt values after 2010 were a little lower than before 2010. This might be a result of 
vaccine program. However, if Rt values after 2010 were excluded, the median Rt would be 1.49 
and did not change much from original estimation. Our study showed that the estimated Thailand 
influenza Rt is lower than previous influenza pandemics,51-56 is comparable to the range of those 
estimated seasonal influenza R0 from developed countries58 and is similar to R0 of pandemic 
influenza A(H1N1) either in Thailand118 or other countries.59,119 This finding is in close 
agreement with a prior study which used a R0 from 1.4 - 1.5 to model influenza in Thailand.7  
The increasing number of reported influenza cases between 2009-2012 is due to outbreak 
of pandemic influenza A(H1N1) and a strengthening of the surveillance system. Unfortunately, 
the surveillance system had no information to separate pandemic influenza cases form seasonal 
influenza cases. This was less likely to affect Rt estimation, as R0 of pandemic influenza 
approach to R0 of seasonal influenza. Also, when we exclude data between 2010 - 2012, the 
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estimated Rt did not change much. After 2009, the influenza vaccine was more available. This 
increased a proportion of immune individuals and resulted in decline of estimated Rt in later 
years. 
 This is a second national scale simulation of influenza in Thailand.  This study reported a 
higher attack rate than the previous study (49.9% versus 33%).7 Our study randomly seeded 100 
infected individuals at beginning as we aimed to model human seasonal influenza that typically 
occur throughout the country, while the previous model seeded 1 infected individual in the rural 
population as an assumption of reassortment of avian virus and human virus. The incidence in 
our model was markedly higher than reported case in surveillance. There were several 
explanations; (1) majority of influenza had mild symptoms, they might seek self-medication and 
did not visit healthcare facilities, or visited hospital but were diagnosed to be common cold or 
flu-liked illness that will not be reported to the surveillance, (2) the surveillance was under-
report,120 (3) limitation of the surveillance that mainly based on clinical diagnosis and collected 
data only from governmental hospitals, (4) there was an effect of some protective interventions 
in population such as vaccination, personal protection and hygiene. Since 2010, influenza 
vaccine became more available but is provided only in some population at risk and has limited 
amount. Also, personal protection was not well practiced in general population.  So, the finding 
reveal that Thailand's surveillance report may have underestimated influenza's incidence. Case-
based surveillance usually represented the tip of iceberg phenomenon. There was high rate of 
asymptomatic infection and most symptomatic cases were self-managing without medical 
consultation.121  
 We observed four weeks period before rising of incidence. This is too short period for 
vaccination after an outbreak occurs, as the influenza vaccine takes about two weeks after 
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vaccination for antibodies to develop in the body and provide protection against influenza virus 
infection. The proper strains of influenza vaccine should be identified before the influenza 
season and vaccination should occur prior to the start of the influenza season.  During the 
influenza season effective control measures should be implemented to minimize number of 
cases. Non pharmaceutical interventions (such as mask wearing, hand washing) may be 
recommended. Antiviral prophylaxis may be alternative intervention but needs high medication 
resource and risks to drug resistance for treatment. 
This study has some strengths. We used Thailand-specific R0 to model influenza burden. 
Even the R0 does not differ from literature, we have more confidence that influenza transmission 
in the model represent to influenza dynamic in Thailand. We conducted a national-scale study 
which epidemiological studies may be difficult to perform. This allows us to estimate influenza 
incidence of the country, especially when asymptomatic infection play some role in disease 
transmission. Our study has some limitations. We assumed no immunity or any intervention. 
This made the simulation had higher attack rate than reality. However, the model can be used as 
baseline for no-intervention scenario, and add other interventions in further simulation to 
measure their effectiveness. The model did not take into account long distance travelling. This 
may increase time of disease's spread, but this is not a major concern as we randomly seeded 100 
infected individuals at beginning. They spread to the whole country and should account for long 
distance travelling. Because of the computational costs involved, the current results do not 
include a sensitivity analysis that involved the underlying transmission parameters. 
In conclusion, the estimated Thailand Rt is comparable to R0 of developed countries. 
Influenza burden may be under recognized in Thailand. Modeling is a tool to provide decision 
makers with information for influenza preparedness and control. 
 56 
Acknowledgments 
Support for this work is provided in part by the National Institute of General Medical Sciences 
under MIDAS grant 1U54GM088491-01 and by the Vaccine Modeling Initiative, funded by the 
Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. This work used the Extreme Science and Engineering 
Discovery Environment (XSEDE), which is supported by National Science Foundation grant 
number ACI-1053575. The authors thank William D Wheaton and RTI International for creating 
a Thai synthetic population.  
2.6 TABLES 
Table 6 The epidemic growth and R0 estimation between year 2003 - 2012 
Year Epidemic growth rate (per day) Rt Predominant subtype in Thailand * 
2012 0.051 1.13 B 
2011 0.042 1.10 A/H3 
2010 0.044 1.11 A/H1 pandemic 2009 
2009 0.189 1.49 A/H1 pandemic 2009 
2008 0.255 1.66 B 
2007 0.141 1.36 A/H3 
2006 0.117 1.30 A/H1 
2005 0.297 1.77 A.H3 
2004 0.224 1.58 Not available 
2003 0.156 1.40 Not available 
* Source: Influenza virological surveillance, the Thailand National Institute of Health (NIH) 
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Table 7 Incidence of influenza by week 
Week Incidence per 100,000 population 
1 0.55 
2 2.36 
3 10.80 
4 49.96 
5 227.36 
6 952.49 
7 3,259.12 
8 7,696.79 
9 11,118.11 
10 10,520.85 
11 7,589.19 
12 4,504.02 
13 2,282.74 
14 1,048.06 
15 430.92 
16 151.13 
17 48.34 
18 10.11 
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2.7 FIGURES 
 
Figure 7 Daily incidence of influenza infection for R0 = 1.4 in the absence of control measures 
 
 
Figure 8 Overall attack rate (all infection) of influenza 
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Figure 9 Attack rate (%) of influenza by week 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10 Incidence of influenza infection over time by R0 in the absence of control measures 
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3.1 ABSTRACT 
Many studies reported that influenza vaccination was associated with reduction in hospitalization 
or death from influenza in both healthy and at-risk medical conditions. Thailand has a current 
vaccine policy targets at healthcare worker (HCWs), people aged 6-24 months or >65 years, 
people with chronic medical condition (CMC), and pregnant women. However, with a limited 
resource, information of optimizing vaccine allocation is needed. The projection of influenza 
burden was studied by fitting an agent-based computer simulation model. The model contains a 
58,354,744 synthetic Thai population, incorporates people with CMC and HCWs. At start, 100 
agents were randomly assigned for initial infection. The model simulated the interactions of 
individuals with others at household, school, workplace, and hospitals over 180 days. Impacts of 
influenza vaccine on morbidity and mortality were simulated at 50%, 75% and 100% coverage.   
The highest attack rate occurs in school-age children and adolescent (15.32%). 100% coverage 
of target population policy can avoid morbidity and mortality by 47.06% and 59.61% in total 
population respectively. However, the benefit is very small for HCWs (3.75% case reduction). 
The most extended policy to include children aged 2-18 years old can avoid >99% of cases. 
Decrement of vaccine coverage from 100% to 75% and 50% coverage has much impact on both 
target population and target population plus children 2-5 years old vaccine policy. Extended 
policy to vaccinate preschool and school-aged children is optimizing strategy. Vaccination alone 
may not prevent influenza outbreak in healthcare settings. Modeling is a tool to provide decision 
makers with information for influenza preparedness and control. 
 
Key words: Influenza, Vaccine, Thailand, Computer simulation 
 62 
3.2 INTRODUCTION 
Vaccination is the principle strategy for reducing the disease burden of many infectious diseases 
such as polio, diphtheria, pertussis, tetanus, measles, rubella, and mumps. Vaccination has both 
direct and indirect effects. Direct effects occur because the person who is vaccinated may have 
reduced risk of becoming infected. In addition, it has the indirect benefit of decreasing 
transmission of the disease, thereby reducing the infection risk even for those who have not been 
vaccinated.  
 Influenza vaccination has been an effective intervention against influenza in developed 
countries. For example, influenza vaccination in the United States has long been recommended 
for all elderly, younger children, pregnant women, persons who have chronic medical conditions, 
with the recent expansion of recommendations to include all children up to age 18 years.122 
Influenza vaccine can prevent influenza-specific illness by 70% to 90% in healthy adults and 
30% to 90% in children.87 Retrospective cohort studies have shown a surprisingly large 
protective effect of influenza vaccination against deaths from any cause, especially among 
elderly.123-125 These studies consistently reported that influenza vaccination was associated with 
reduction in hospitalization or death for pneumonia, influenza, all respiratory conditions, cardiac 
diseases and stroke in both healthy and at-risk medical conditions.  
 The impact of influenza vaccine is greater in persons with high-risk medical groups. 
Influenza vaccination is most effective when circulating viruses are well-matched with vaccine 
viruses. However, influenza viruses are constantly changing, and the vaccine will not prevent 
disease from other strains of influenza viruses not contained in the vaccine. Each year scientists 
try to match the viruses in the vaccine to those most likely to cause flu that year. So annual 
vaccination is recommended.  
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 Thailand has a policy to use influenza vaccine to prevent and control influenza outbreak. 
However, with a limited resource, information of optimizing vaccine allocation is needed to 
guide the policy. The general problem is how to choose groups of the population that should 
receive priority in getting the intervention. In 2013, Thailand Ministry of Public Health 
recommended that the following groups should have higher priority to receive the seasonal 
influenza vaccine based primarily on their occupational risk to transmit influenza, increased risk 
of infection or experiencing more severe influenza-related disease complications: (1) healthcare, 
outbreak investigation and laboratory personnel, (2) persons aged 2 through 65 years who have 
health conditions associated with higher risk of medical complications from influenza, (3) all 
persons aged > 65 years, (4) all children from 6 months through 2 years of age, (5) pregnant 
women with gestational age > 4 months, (6) persons with mental retardation, (7) persons with 
thalassemia or immuno-compromised, (8) obese people (body weight > 100 Kg or body mass 
index > 35 Kg/m2). However, vaccine supply may be limited and may not cover 100% of the 
target population. 
 As a result some key questions need to be answered: which sub-group should receive 
greatest priority, and how strictly (or vaccine coverage) should this recommendation be adhered 
to prioritized group. The evaluation of vaccination policies for their implementation is essential 
to allocate resources and to minimize disease burden. This study has aim to address the potential 
benefit on various vaccine allocation scenarios in a limited resource situation. 
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3.3 METHODS 
Synthetic population data 
A synthetic population (with school and workplace assignments) of Thailand was developed by 
the Research Triangle Institute (RTI International).83 In summary, RTI International used a 
proportional iterative method82 to generate an agent population from census aggregated data. 
Thai census data (year 2000) on household size and age distributions were used to generate the 
synthesized agents and households. Each agent had a set of socio-demographic characteristics 
that included age, sex, employment status, occupation, and household location. School data (year 
2011) from the Thai Ministry of Education84 on ≈38,000 schools were used to determine the 
distribution of school sizes, number and proportions of children in school as a function of age for 
school assignment. The schools assignment method was based on the assumption that students 
are enrolled at the closest school having adequate capacity. Data of Thailand Industrial census in 
year 200785 were used for workplace assignment. The data indicated numbers and percentages of 
workers by size of work place (1 - 15, 16 - 25, 26 - 30, 31 - 50, 51 - 200, and >200 workers). The 
locations of workplaces were generated. Then, each non-school age population was assigned to a 
workplace such that the distribution and capacity of each workplace was appropriate.  
 We used data of the actual hospitals in Thailand86 to create synthetic hospitals with 
estimated number of HCWs. The method assumed that the number of HCWs who interact with 
patients was proportional to the number of beds by the value of 1 to 1 (e.g. a hospital with 100 
beds would have 100 HCWs who interact with patients). The simulation then found a synthetic 
workplace with approximately the same number of employees and moved the assigned 
employees to work in the hospital as healthcare workers (HCWs). To determine which hospital a 
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family will visit, we used a gravity model where the probability of going to a given hospital was 
determined by the (number of beds) / (distance from household to hospital)^2. 
 We randomly assigned synthetic population to had chronic medical condition (CMC) 
based on the 4th National Health Examination Survey of Thailand (year 2008 - 2009). The survey 
reported that among people age > 15 years old, prevalence of asthma was 3%, chronic 
obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD) was 0.4%, chronic renal disease was 0.8%, diabetes was 
6.9%, and coronary heart disease (CHD) was 1.4%. Prevalence of diabetes and CHD was 
stratified by age group. The point prevalence of pregnant women was estimated from average of 
age-specific fertility rate year 2002 - 2011. We assumed people with CMC will visit hospital 
once a month for disease follow up and getting drugs. 
 Agents move among their households, assigned workplaces or hospitals (for employed 
adults), schools (for school-aged children) and various locations in the community, where they 
interact with other agents who were household members, workplace mate, and classmate. 
Disease and model parameterization 
Disease parameters and assumptions followed the process described in study by Cooley et al.80 
and systematic review of Zhou et al.81 Individuals are classified according to theirs infection and 
immune status as either susceptible (S), latent or exposed (E), infectious (I), or recovered (R). 
All individuals are initially susceptible to influenza until infectious individuals are introduced 
into the model. Each newly infected individual entered a latent state. During this time, the agent 
was infected but not yet infectious to others. We assumed that infectiousness and symptoms 
began at the same time as the viruses are shed via droplets produced when infected people cough 
or sneeze. Thus latent period (the time from infection to when a host is able to transmit the 
pathogen) was approximate to incubation period. Then, the agent moves to the infectious state, in 
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which the agent may infect others. Two-third of infected agents develop symptoms.64,76,117 
Finally, the agent enters the recovered state and remains immune to subsequent infections. 
We assumed the following base probability values for hospitalization, outpatient-care and 
case fatality: outpatient-care probability = 0.88,126 hospitalization probability = 0.22 (from 
database of Thailand Notifiable Disease Report, that was a proportion of inpatient among 
reported influenza cases), case fatality probability = 0.0000715.127 Risk factors for severe 
outcomes following pandemic influenza A (H1N1) infection are similar to those for seasonal 
influenza.128 We applied risk ratios of hospitalization or death from Van Kerkhove et al.128 to 
those influenza cases who had chronic medical condition(s) or pregnancy in our simulations. We 
assumed that if an agent is hospitalized, then others in their household may visit them with a 
probability of 0.25 on each day that they remain hospitalized. 
 The projection of influenza burden was studied by fitting an agent-based computer 
simulation model (ABM). This study used a Framework for Reconstructing Epidemiological 
Dynamics (FRED) for modeling. FRED is an open source, modeling system developed by the 
University of Pittsburgh Public Health Dynamics Laboratory in collaboration with the Pittsburgh 
Supercomputing Center (PSU) and the School of Computer Science at Carnegie Mellon 
University.79 The model was a stochastic, spatially structured, individual-based discrete time 
simulation. Individuals are co-located in households, with households being constructed to 
reflect typical generational structure while matching empirical distributions of age structure and 
household size for Thailand. 
 The probability that an infected agent transmitted influenza to susceptible agent depended 
on the rate of potentially infectious contacts, and the probability per contact of transmitting 
influenza. Every susceptible agent who contacted an infectious agents had a probability of 
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disease transmission (per contact), derived from prior studies of the 1957–1958 Asian influenza 
pandemic.7,64,76 As in Cooley et al.80, we assumed that 50% of sick agents stay at home and do 
not interact with any agents outside of the household. Additionally, we assumed that all 
community contacts increase by 50% on weekends. The model was calibrated using the 
Ferguson et al. approach from historical (1957–1958, 1968–1969) influenza pandemics.7 We 
specifically used the 30–70 rule developed in which 30% of all transmission occurred in the 
household and 70% of all transmission occurred outside the household (33% in the general 
community, and 37% in schools and workplaces).7 The strategy was to estimate mean contact 
rate per day at each location that produced and epidemic that satisfied the 30-70 rule calibration 
criteria. To achieve this rule, within household contacts were treated differently than other 
locations. We assumed that each pair of agents within a household make contact each day with a 
specified probability. This probability is tunes as part of the calibration step to achieve the 30-70 
target distribution. At the start of each simulation, 100 agents were randomly assigned for initial 
infection. The individuals interact daily with others in the same household, school and workplace 
with a fixed mean number of people that they contact per day (from calibration step). We 
considered influenza R0 = 1.4. The simulations were run over 180 days. Each presented result is 
the average of 7 simulation runs for one experiment (one vaccine strategy). 
Vaccine efficacy and vaccine strategies 
We assumed a vaccine efficacy by age groups as follows: children age 6 months to 18 years old 
is 0.62 129, adults age 19 to 64 years old is 0.73 130, adults age 65 and over is 0.58 131. We 
assumed that individuals are vaccinated at a sufficient time prior to the epidemic to allow for full 
immunity to develop (base on its efficacy). Five vaccine policy schemes were modeled: (1) no 
vaccination, (2) 100% vaccination coverage in the entire Thai population, (3) 100% vaccination 
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coverage in the target population (healthcare personnel, persons who have chronic health 
conditions, all persons aged > 65 years, all children from 6 months through 2 years of age, 
pregnant women), (4) 100% vaccination coverage in the target population plus children age 2 to 
5 years old, (5) 100% vaccination coverage in the target population plus children age 2 to 18 
years old. We also repeated vaccine strategies with both 50% and 75% vaccine coverage. 
Computational specifics 
Simulations were performed on Blacklight at PSU. Blacklight is an SGI servers, clusters and 
supercomputers, shared-memory system comprising 256 blades. Each blade holds 2 Intel Xeon 
X7560 (Nehalem) eight-core processors, for a total of 4096 cores across the whole machine. 
Each core has a clock rate of 2.27 GHz. Each experiment (7 simulation runs in parallel) is run 
using parallel computing over 16 computer nodes, taking an average of 8 hours on each 
experiment (104 hours of total computer time). 
3.4 RESULT 
A synthetic population size of 58,354,744 was created to represent the Thai population; 2.55% 
were <2 years, 6.36% were 2-5 years, 22.43% were 6-18 years, 62.54% were 19-65 years, and 
6.11% were > 65 years old. There were 4,926,876 people with CMC (8.44%) and 55,550 HCWs 
(0.1% of adults).  
No vaccination scenario 
At baseline, incidence of infection gradually increases and peaks on day 127 after the initiation 
of the first 100 infected agents. At the end of day 180, there are 7,109,427 cumulative new 
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infected agents. The overall attack rate is estimated to be 12.18%. Of all infection, 4,730,594 
infected agents are symptomatic case. Symptomatic attack rate is 8.11%. About 36% of cases 
occurs in those < 18 years, 59% in 19–64 year olds, and 5% in those >65 years old. The highest 
attack rate occurs in school-age children and adolescent (15.32%) and healthcare workers 
(76.67%). There are 2,219 influenza deaths.  
The overall mortality rate is 3.8 per 100,000 population. The highest death rate occurs in 
elderly (11.54 per 100,000 population), and healthcare workers (27.52 per 100,000 population). 
Overall case fatality rate (CFR) is 0.03%, and the highest is found among elderly (0.12%), and 
people with CMC (0.12%). Specific morbidity and mortality rates are listed in Table 8. 
Impact of 100% vaccine coverage for different strategies 
Vaccination can reduce influenza incidence and defers the peak of outbreak; the more extended 
policy, the higher benefit (Figure 11). On day 180 after the initiation of the 100 agents with an 
infection; vaccination among target population and extended policies has cumulative attack rate 
range from 0.08% to 6.45%, mortality rate ranges from 0.02 to 1.54 per 100,100 population, 
depending on the vaccine policy chosen (Table 9). The extended policy to cover children age 2-
18 years old provides as much benefit close to 100% vaccine coverage in the total population.  
 Vaccinating children can reduces influenza morbidity and mortality for both children and 
adults. In sub-population, for 100% target population policy, the proportions of total cases that 
can be avoided range from 3.75% to 84.17%. The highest reduction is observed among people 
with CMC, follow by elderly. The benefit is very small for HCWs (3.75%), compared with other 
groups that also had influenza vaccine. Those who did not get vaccination has burden reduction 
almost half. We observe higher vaccine impact with similar pattern when the policy extend to 
cover children aged 2 to 5 years old. The most extended policy to include children aged 2 to 18 
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years old can avoid >99% of cases except HCWs (about 77%), adults are prevented even they 
were not vaccinated (Table 10). 
One hundred percent target population policy can prevent death 29.91% to 85.39%. 
Similar to case reduction; the highest reduction is observed among people with CMC, and lowest 
among HCWs. Impact of vaccine to prevent death among HCWs is not as high as other groups in 
all vaccine policies (Table 11). 
Impact of vaccine coverage 
We show in Figures 12 and 13 the proportion of cases and deaths reduction caused by various 
vaccine coverage versus no vaccination. The decrement of vaccine coverage from 100% to 75% 
and 50% coverage has much impact on both target population and target population plus children 
2-5 years old vaccine policy. About 40% of the prevented burden are removed if vaccine 
coverage drops from 100% to 50%. Vaccine coverage has less impact on target population plus 
children 2-18 years old vaccine policy. The proportion of prevention is still above 90% for both 
case and deaths even with 50% coverage.  We observe similar pattern of decreasing prevention 
in all sub-population except HCWs, which has low benefit with low vaccine coverage for all 
vaccine policies. 
3.5 DISCUSSION 
Our study results are similar to other modeling studies of optimizing influenza vaccine 
allocation. These studies had consistent results that prioritization of children age 5-19 years old 
leads to the greatest reduction of the influenza incidence.74,132-135 However, in term of cost 
effectiveness, the benefit is greatest for strategy that prioritize to population with a high risk of 
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complications. This depend on age-structure, if a country has a high proportion of elderly, it 
would be most cost effective to vaccinate elderly people.74,135 
 Children play a primary role in influenza transmission because they have a tendency to 
acquire and shed influenza. Our study is in agreement with those of influenza's spread, where 
school-aged children and youths were identified as the age group most likely to transmit 
influenza because of the nature of their contact networks.136-138 We also found that preschool age 
children are an important role of the transmission, similar to study of identifying pediatric age 
groups for influenza vaccination.139 There may be benefit in vaccinating children older than the 
current targeted age of 6 months through 2 years of age. Vaccinating preschool and school-aged 
children yields a substantial reduction of influenza morbidity and mortality. Vaccinating children 
produces both direct prevention in the children vaccinated and indirect prevention in the rest of 
the population as a result of herd protection.73,140,141 The obvious benefit is observed from 
vaccine scenario that include school-aged children because this age group has the highest attack 
rate and would be the source of secondary infections to other household members. The vaccine's 
impact is still impressive even the vaccine coverage drops to 50%. This is a more practical 
strategy because it is less likely that a vaccine policy can achieve 100% coverage. Also, a school-
based vaccination program is a feasible strategy that can enhance the current influenza 
vaccination program administered at the healthcare settings. 
 The results of our simulation model demonstrate that the current Thailand influenza 
vaccine has moderate effect to reduce influenza morbidity (about 47%), with a little higher 
reduction of mortality (about 60%). This is because the policy targets those who are likely to 
have severe complications if they got influenza (such as infant, elderly and people with medical 
condition), rather than those people who are likely to transmit the disease (such as school-aged 
 72 
children). With this level of burden reduction, this policy seems to be not effective enough to 
prevent influenza in Thailand. In 2014, the Thailand Ministry of Public Health prepared 
influenza vaccines for current vaccine policy approximately 3,400,000 doses, which cover about 
60% of target population. This may not achieve 47% morbidity and 60% mortality reduction as 
we assumed 100% vaccine coverage in our simulation. To reach 100% coverage, Thailand has to 
prepare about 6,000,000 doses of vaccine, but this cost may limit the policy. 
 Base on Thailand's population registration in year 2013, children aged 2-5 years old are 
4.8% of total population. If the vaccine policy extend to cover these children (assumed 100% 
coverage), Thailand has to prepare an additional 78% of vaccine (about total 10.5 million doses), 
and can avoid influenza cases and deaths 73% and 79% respectively. However, it is difficult to 
reach that such high vaccine coverage. Then, the mitigation of influenza burden would decrease. 
Considered school-aged children, they are 17.4% of total population. If the policy extend to 
cover this age group (assumed 100% coverage), Thailand has to prepared additional 168% of 
vaccine (about total 15.7 million doses), and can avoid influenza cases and deaths  >99%. 
Alternatively, if this policy aims at 50% coverage of all target population, this will requires 7.8 
million doses of vaccine, but still can avoid about 93% of cases and 94% of deaths.  
 Vaccinating healthcare workers seems to be not effective intervention. This is because we 
assumed 88% of sick people visit healthcare settings,126 that means hospitals will pool with many 
influenza cases. When patients visit healthcare facilities, they will interact closely with HCWs. 
Assuming vaccine efficacy at 73%, even 100% vaccine coverage among HCWs will has little 
benefit when they have high number of effective contact to infected individuals. Efficacy of 
influenza vaccine is not quite high because antigenic drift of influenza viruses allows the 
seasonal viruses to escape the neutralizing activity of antibodies induced by previous infections 
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or vaccination.142 This is confirmed by vaccine policy that includes all children and youths, it 
lower the incidence amongst HCWs significantly. Healthcare workforce is very crucial in 
medical care. If HCWs are infected, they will not be able to perform their services and could 
infect other patients and colleagues. Cross-transmission of influenza infection from healthcare 
workers to patients has been described.33-36 To prevent outbreak in healthcare settings, we should 
not rely on only vaccine strategy, we need to consider additional intervention such as personal 
protection and hygiene.  
This study has some strengths. We conducted a national-scale study which clinical trials 
and epidemiological studies may be difficult to perform. Including people with CMC and 
pregnant women makes more complete picture of influenza burden and allow us to evaluate 
impact of vaccine on all target populations in the vaccine policy. Our study has some limitations. 
All computer models are simplification of reality and cannot account for every possible factor or 
interaction. We considered all HCWs as a uniform group. In fact, they may have different chance 
of contacting patients based on their duties. Our model only included HCWs in secondary and 
tertiary care hospitals and did not include sub-district health promoting hospitals (primary care 
centers) in the country. Because of the computational costs involved, the current results do not 
include a sensitivity analysis that involved the underlying transmission parameters and case 
fatality parameters.  
In conclusion, current Thailand's vaccine policy and coverage may not effective enough 
to control influenza. Extended policy to vaccinate preschool and school-aged children is 
optimizing strategy. Vaccination alone may not prevent influenza outbreak in healthcare settings. 
Modeling is a tool to provide decision makers with information for influenza preparedness and 
control. 
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3.6 TABLES 
Table 8 Specific morbidity and mortality rate of influenza in no vaccination scenario 
Population Number 
Case Death 
Number Attack rate 
(%) 
Number Death rate 
(per 100,000) 
All 58,354,744 7,109,427 12.18 22,219 3.80 
Age (years) 
<2 
2-5 
6-18 
19-65 
>65 
 
1,489,947 
3,709,878 
13,091,312 
36,495,519 
3,568,088 
 
161,669 
422,586 
2,005,482 
4,179,841 
339,850 
 
10.85 
11.39 
15.32 
11.45 
9.52 
 
47 
80 
382 
1,299 
412 
 
3.15 
2.14 
2.92 
3.56 
11.54 
People with CMC 4,926,876 544,238 11.05 659 13.38 
Pregnant women 720,069 86,850 12.06 27 3.67 
Healthcare workers 55,550 42,590 76.67 16 27.52 
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Table 9 Morbidity and mortality rate of influenza by different vaccine policy 
Vaccine policy 
Case Death 
Number Attack rate 
(%) 
Number Death rate 
(per 100,000) 
No vaccination 7,109,427 12.18 22,219 3.80 
100% of total population 63 <0.01 0 0.00 
100% of target population* 3,763,862 6.45 897 1.54 
100% of target population* 
+ children age 2-5 yrs old 
1,948,694 3.34 460 0.79 
100% of target population* 
+ children age 2-18 yrs old 
44,504 0.08 100 0.02 
* Target population: healthcare personnel, persons who have chronic health conditions, all 
persons aged > 65 years, all children from 6 months through 2 years of age, pregnant women 
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Table 10 Proportion of cases prevented, by different vaccine policy (100% coverage) 
Population 
% of cased that can be avoided (95%CI) 
Target population* Target population* plus 
children 2-5 years old 
Target population* plus 
children 2-18 years old 
Total population 47.06% (46.97, 47.15) 72.59% (72.51, 72.67) 99.37% (99.30, 99.44) 
Age (years) 
<2 
2-5 
6-18 
19-65 
>65 
 
62.62% (62.08, 63.17) 
45.12% (44.76, 45.48) 
41.86% (41.70, 42.02) 
46.57% (46.46, 46.68) 
78.74% (78.38, 79.09) 
 
84.11% (83.61, 84.61) 
89.90% (89.60, 90.20) 
68.99% (68.85, 69.14) 
70.81% (70.71, 70.91) 
88.70% (88.36, 89.04) 
 
99.65% (99.19, 100.11) 
99.76% (99.48, 100.05) 
99.78% (99.65, 99.91) 
99.10% (99.01, 99.19) 
99.71% (99.39, 100.03) 
People with CMC 84.17% (83.90, 84.44) 91.60% (91.34, 91.86) 99.78% (99.53, 100.03) 
Pregnant women 66.35% (65.62, 67.08) 81.24% (80.55, 81.92) 99.50% (98.88, 100.13) 
Healthcare workers 3.75% (3.09, 4.41) 7.28% (6.60, 7.95) 76.60% (75.98, 77.22) 
* Target population: healthcare personnel, persons who have chronic health conditions, all 
persons aged > 65 years, all children from 6 months through 2 years of age, pregnant women 
  % of cases that can be avoided = (attack rate of no vaccination - attack rate of vaccine 
policies) x 100 ÷ attack rate of no vaccination 
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Table 11 Proportion of deaths prevented, by different vaccine policy (100% coverage) 
Population 
% of death that can be avoided (95%CI) 
Target population Target population + 
children 2-5 years old 
Target population + 
children 2-18 years old 
Total population 59.61% (54.68, 64.54) 79.27% (74.70, 83.85) 99.47% (95.29, 103.64) 
Age (years) 
<2 
2-5 
6-18 
19-65 
>65 
 
57.14% (22.97, 91.31) 
44.86% (17.45, 72.28) 
43.85% (31.31, 56.38) 
57.93% (51.44, 64.41) 
82.66% (72.20, 93.12) 
 
82.07% (51.02, 113.11) 
89.73% (66.62, 112.84) 
71.90% (60.55, 83.26) 
77.02% (70.99, 83.05) 
90.88% (80.79, 100.97) 
 
99.39% (70.72, 128.07) 
99.82% (77.79, 121.85) 
99.85% (89.81, 109.89) 
99.26% (93.80, 104.72) 
99.69% (90.02, 109.36) 
People with CMC 85.39% (77.22, 93.56) 92.22% (84.29, 100.14) 99.67% (92.03, 107.32) 
Pregnant women 72.97% (30.00, 115.94) 87.57% (47.14, 127.99) 98.92% (60.59, 137.25) 
Healthcare workers 29.91% (-35.47, 95.28) 28.97% (-36.58, 94.53) 82.24% (27.85, 136.64) 
* Target population: healthcare personnel, persons who have chronic health conditions, all 
persons aged > 65 years, all children from 6 months through 2 years of age, pregnant women 
  % of deaths that can be avoided = (mortality rate of no vaccination - mortality rate of vaccine 
policies) x 100 ÷ mortality rate of no vaccination 
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3.7 FIGURES 
 
Figure 11 Daily incidence of influenza infection for different vaccine policies 
 
 
Figure 12 Proportion of cases that can be avoided for three vaccine coverage 
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Figure 13 Proportion of deaths that can be avoided for three vaccine coverage 
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4.1 ABSTRACT 
Some non-pharmaceutical interventions such as mask wearing or hand washing have been shown 
protective effect in reducing influenza illness. They are inexpensive and can be implemented 
widely even in limited healthcare resource settings. However, there was a few study that model 
their impact on influenza burden on population. The projection of influenza burden was studied 
by fitting an agent-based computer simulation model. The model contains a 58,354,744 synthetic 
Thai population, incorporates people with CMC and HCWs. At start, 100 agents were randomly 
assigned for initial infection. The model simulated the interactions of individuals with others at 
household, school, workplace, and hospitals over 180 days. Impacts of face mask wearing and 
hand washing on morbidity and mortality were simulated at 10%, 25%, 50%, 75% and 100% 
coverage. 100% compliance of combined policy can avoid morbidity and mortality >99% in total 
population. The benefit is slightly small for HCWs (97.19% case reduction). If the population 
can afford >50% compliance of the intervention, the proportion of cases reduction still >98% for 
all adherence of mask wearing. Face masks and hand washing are effective strategies for 
countries with limited supplies of vaccines and antiviral drugs. Modeling is a tool to provide 
decision makers with information for influenza preparedness and control. 
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4.2 INTRODUCTION 
Influenza vaccination and antiviral drugs have been effective interventions against seasonal 
influenza outbreaks in developed countries.123-125 In order for vaccines to provide protection 
against infections, the vaccine strain must be antigenically similar to the epidemic or pandemic 
strain. Consequently, vaccine production cannot begin until the circulated viral strain has been 
isolated and the lead time for vaccine production is typically 4–6 months or more. So, 
vaccination is not a prompt intervention if an outbreak of new viral strains occur. Antiviral drug 
might be effective to reduce influenza burden,6,8 but its stockpiling is very expensive and might 
not be practical to many countries. As a result antiviral prophylaxis is not a standard policy in 
developing countries including Thailand. Instead, non-pharmaceutical interventions are more 
common; such as social distancing, isolation and quarantine, personal protection and hygiene 
measures (hand washing and face mask wearing).  
In the event of an influenza pandemic, effective vaccine and antiviral drugs may be 
lacking. Disrupting environmental transmission of the influenza virus using non-pharmacological 
interventions will be the only viable strategy to protect the public.143 However, delayed 
implementation of these interventions might provide less benefit.144,145 
 Various non-pharmaceutical intervention strategies are a first line of defense against 
outbreak of infectious diseases because they can be implemented rapidly,146 and not depend on 
influenza viral strains like vaccination. Many studies model effect of social distancing such as 
school closure and travel restriction. School closure has been considered a useful strategy to 
control the spread of influenza; however, its effect was not consensus. Some of these studies 
demonstrated school closure are capable of mitigating influenza overall attack rate.145,147,148 
Several studies demonstrated small or no reduction in the overall attack rate but can delay the 
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peak of epidemic.149-152 These studies showed that to gain benefit either attack rate reduction or 
delay the epidemic, duration of closing school should be maintained relatively long (about 4-8 
weeks). This makes school closure policy a significant economic impact and community 
controversial as parent have to leave form work to care for unattended-school children.98,99 
 Some non-pharmaceutical interventions such as mask wearing or hand washing have 
been shown protective effect in reducing influenza illness and upper-respiratory tract infections 
from many controlled trials.104,106-114 Adherent use of surgical masks significantly reduces the 
risk for influenza-like illness (ILI) infection among household members of ILI patients, with a 
hazard ratio equal to 0.26.104 Hand washing program can reduce respiratory illness 21%-52%.106-
112 In contrast, some studied showed no protective effect of face mask use alone or hand washing 
alone on ILI or influenza, but revealed effectiveness of both interventions combined. The 
combined intervention can reduce respiratory illness range from 35%-51%.113,114 Face masks are 
used to limit influenza transmission by minimizing the distribution of large secretion droplets 
produced during sneezing or coughing.  Hand washing can reduce the transmission by indirect 
contact with contaminated common surfaces. They are non-invasive interventions and do not 
depend on healthcare personnel. Both interventions are inexpensive and can be implemented 
widely even in limited healthcare resource settings.  
Face masks have been stockpiled for influenza preparedness and are currently 
recommended to prevent influenza infection in several countries, including Thailand. The 
effective management and control of infectious disease is increasingly done with substantial 
input from mathematical models and simulations, which are used to provide predictions about 
the likely success of public health measures.47 Therefore, it is becoming increasingly important 
that epidemiological models produce accurate quantitative prediction of disease and impact of 
 85 
control measures. There are a few study which use computer simulation model the impact of face 
masks on influenza burden on population. These studied reported that face mask use is an 
effective intervention strategy in delaying and influenza pandemic and reducing the spread of 
influenza.153-155  However, there is no published study that simulate impact of hand washing 
alone or combined face mask wearing and hand washing at population level. In practice, it is less 
likely that a public health campaign will suggest a single intervention, neither face mask use nor 
hand washing. Instead, both intervention often be recommended together.   
 The role of prompt non-pharmaceutical interventions on influenza outbreak control is not 
well understood in Thailand.  The modeling of face mask use and hand washing interventions 
can be used as evidence for introduction for new intervention policies. This study has aim to 
identify effect of promoting health behavior interventions (hand washing and face mask wearing) 
on influenza outbreak control.  
4.3 METHODS 
Synthetic population data 
A synthetic population (with school and workplace assignments) of Thailand was developed by 
the Research Triangle Institute (RTI International).83 In summary, RTI International used a 
proportional iterative method82 to generate an agent population from census aggregated data. 
Thai census data (year 2000) on household size and age distributions were used to generate the 
synthesized agents and households. Each agent had a set of socio-demographic characteristics 
and that included age, sex, employment status, occupation, and household. School data (year 
2011) from the Thai Ministry of Education84 on ≈38,000 schools were used to determine the 
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distribution of school sizes, number and proportions of children in school as a function of age for 
school assignment. The schools assignment method was based on the assumption that students 
are enrolled at the closest school having adequate capacity. Data of Thailand Industrial census in 
year 200785 were used for workplace assignment. The data indicated numbers and percentages of 
workers by size of work place (1 - 15, 16 - 25, 26 - 30, 31 - 50, 51 - 200, and >200 workers). The 
locations of workplaces were generated. Then, each non-school age population was assigned to a 
workplace such that the distribution and capacity of each workplace was appropriate.  
 We used data of the actual hospitals in Thailand86 to create synthetic hospitals with 
estimated number of HCWs. The method assumed that the number of HCWs who interact with 
patients was proportional to the number of beds by the value of 1 to 1 (e.g. a hospital with 100 
beds would have 100 HCWs who interact with patients). The simulation then found a synthetic 
workplace with approximately the same number of employees and moved the assigned 
employees to work in the hospital as healthcare workers (HCWs). To determine which hospital a 
family will visit, we used a gravity model where the probability of going to a given hospital was 
determined by the (number of beds) / (distance from household to hospital)^2. 
 We randomly assigned synthetic population to had chronic medical condition (CMC) 
based on the 4th National Health Examination Survey of Thailand (year 2008 - 2009). The survey 
reported that among people age > 15 years old, prevalence of asthma was 3%, chronic 
obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD) was 0.4%, chronic renal disease was 0.8%, diabetes was 
6.9%, and coronary heart disease (CHD) was 1.4%. Prevalence of diabetes and CHD was 
stratified by age group. The point prevalence of pregnant women was estimated from average of 
age-specific fertility rate year 2002 - 2011. We assumed people with CMC will visit hospital 
once a month for disease follow-up and getting drugs. 
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 Agents move among their households, assigned workplaces or hospitals (for employed 
adults), schools (for school-aged children) and various locations in the community, where they 
interact with other agents who were household members, workplace mate, and classmate. 
Disease and model parameterization 
Disease parameters and assumptions followed the process described in study by Cooley et al.80 
and systematic review of Zhou et al.81 Individuals are classified according to theirs infection and 
immune status as either susceptible (S), latent or exposed (E), infectious (I), or recovered (R). 
All individuals are initially susceptible to influenza until infectious individuals are introduced 
into the model. Each newly infected individual entered a latent state. During this time, the agent 
was infected but not yet infectious to others. We assumed that infectiousness and symptoms 
began at the same time as the viruses are shed via droplets produced when infected people cough 
or sneeze. Thus latent period (the time from infection to when a host is able to transmit the 
pathogen) was approximate to incubation period. Then, the agent moves to the infectious state, in 
which the agent may infect others. Two-third of infected agents develop symptoms.64,76,117 
Finally, the agent enters the recovered state and remains immune to subsequent infections. 
We assumed the following base probability values for hospitalization, outpatient-care and 
case fatality: outpatient-care probability = 0.88,126 hospitalization probability = 0.22 (from 
database of Thailand Notifiable Disease Report, that was a proportion of inpatient among 
reported influenza cases), case fatality probability = 0.0000715.127 Risk factors for severe 
outcomes following pandemic influenza A (H1N1) infection are similar to those for seasonal 
influenza.128 We applied risk ratios of hospitalization or death from Van Kerkhove et al.128 to 
those influenza cases who had chronic medical condition(s) or pregnancy in our simulations. We 
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assumed that if an agent is hospitalized, then others in their household may visit them with a 
probability of 0.25 on each day that they remain hospitalized. 
 The projection of influenza burden was studied by fitting an agent-based computer 
simulation model (ABM). This study used a Framework for Reconstructing Epidemiological 
Dynamics (FRED) for modeling. FRED is an open source, modeling system developed by the 
University of Pittsburgh Public Health Dynamics Laboratory in collaboration with the Pittsburgh 
Supercomputing Center (PSU) and the School of Computer Science at Carnegie Mellon 
University.79 The model was a stochastic, spatially structured, individual-based discrete time 
simulation. Agents are co-located in households, with households being constructed to reflect 
typical generational structure while matching empirical distributions of age structure and 
household size for Thailand. 
 The probability that an infected agent transmitted influenza to susceptible agent depended 
on the rate of potentially infectious contacts, and the probability per contact of transmitting 
influenza. Every susceptible agent who contacted an infectious agents had a probability of 
disease transmission (per contact), derived from prior studies of the 1957–1958 Asian influenza 
pandemic.7,64,76 As in Cooley et al.80, we assumed that 50% of sick agents stay at home and do 
not interact with any agents outside of the household. Additionally, we assumed that all 
community contacts increase by 50% on weekends. The model was calibrated using the 
Ferguson et al. approach from historical (1957–1958, 1968–1969) influenza pandemics.7  
We specifically used the 30-70 rule developed in which 30% of all transmission occurred 
in the household and 70% occurred outside the household (33% in the general community, and 
37% in schools and workplaces)7. The strategy was to estimate mean contact rate per day at each 
location that produced and epidemic that satisfied the 30-70 rule calibration criteria. To achieve 
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this rule, within household contacts were treated differently than other locations. We assumed 
that each pair of agents within a household make contact each day with a specified probability. 
This probability is tuned as part of the calibration step to achieve the 30-70 target distribution. At 
the start of each simulation, 100 agents were randomly assigned for initial infection. The 
individuals interact daily with others in the same household, school and workplace with a fixed 
mean number of people that they contact per day (from calibration step). We considered 
influenza R0 = 1.4. The simulations were run over 180 days. Each presented result is the average 
of 7 simulation runs for one experiment (one intervention strategy). 
Efficacy and strategies of face mask use plus hand washing   
When infected agents had symptom of influenza, they had to wear a standard surgical mask and 
changed daily. We assumed that they wore face mask at all time according to their adherence. 
The adherence was assumed for 3 durations; only the first day of symptom, first 2 days of 
symptoms, and entire period of symptoms. Hand washing was defined as washing hands using 
soap and water for ≈45 seconds before and after meals, after using the bathroom, and after 
coughing or sneezing on hands. We modeled the combined intervention and used an efficacy 
value of 0.33 derived from the Cowling et al.’s study.114 This means the combined intervention 
can reduce influenza infection by 33%. 
In reality, compliance to a control measure may be less than 100%, especially for the 
health behavior, a series of compliance levels (10%, 25%, 50%, 75% and 100%) were simulated 
for both face mask use and hand washing. 
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Computational specifics 
Simulations were performed on Blacklight at PSU. Blacklight is an SGI servers, clusters and 
supercomputers, shared-memory system comprising 256 blades. Each blade holds 2 Intel Xeon 
X7560 (Nehalem) eight-core processors, for a total of 4096 cores across the whole machine. 
Each core has a clock rate of 2.27 GHz. Each experiment (7 simulation runs in parallel) is run 
using parallel computing over 16 computer nodes, taking an average of 8 hours on each 
experiment (128 hours of total computer time). 
4.4 RESULTS 
A synthetic population size of 58,354,744 was created to represent the Thai population; 2.55% 
were <2 years, 6.36% were 2-5 years, 22.43% were 6-18 years, 62.54% were 19-65 years, and 
6.11% were > 65 years old. There were 4,926,876 people with CMC (8.44%) and 55,550 HCWs 
(0.1% of adults).   
No intervention scenario 
At baseline, incidence of infection gradually increases and peaks on day 127 after the initiation 
of the first 100 infected agents. At the end of day 180, there are 7,109,427 cumulative new 
infected agents. The overall attack rate is estimated to be 12.18%. Of all infection, 4,730,594 
infected agents are symptomatic case. Symptomatic attack rate is 8.11%. About 36% of cases 
occurs in those < 18 years, 59% in 19–64 year olds, and 5% in those >65 years old. The highest 
attack rate occurs in school-age children and adolescent (15.32%) and HCWs (76.67%). There 
are 2,219 influenza deaths. The overall mortality rate is 3.8 per 100,000 population. The highest 
death rate occurs in elderly (11.54 per 100,000 population), and healthcare workers (27.52 per 
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100,000 population). Overall case fatality rate (CFR) is 0.03%, and the highest is found among 
elderly (0.12%), and people with CMC (0.12%). Specific morbidity and mortality rates are listed 
in Table 12. 
Impact of combined face mask and hand washing, 100% coverage 
On day 180 after the initiation of the hundred agents with an infection; combined face mask 
wearing and hand washing policies has number of cases range from 1,811 to 4,090 cases 
(cumulative attack rate <0.01%), number of deaths range from 1 to 2 deaths (mortality rate <0.01 
per 100,100 population), depending on the adherence of face mask wearing (Table 13). 
In sub-population, for 100% compliance of combined policy with 1 day wearing mask, 
the proportions of total cases that can be avoided are >99.9% except among HCWs that is 
97.19%. This is because majority of cases is observed among HCWs (29.3%). If compliance of 
wearing mask increase, we observe similar pattern of increasing prevention in all sub-population. 
Wearing mask for whole period of symptom can avoid case among HCWs up to 98.62%. 
In case the population cannot achieve 100% coverage of the combined intervention, the 
protective effect decline, especially when the coverage drops to 10% (Table 14).  However, if the 
population can achieve >50% compliance of the interventions, the proportion of cases reduction 
still >98%.  
4.5 DISCUSSION 
Our results suggest that face mask use among symptomatic influenza cases combined with hand 
washing at population level can decrease transmission significantly to contain the outbreak. Even 
its efficacy is much smaller than influenza vaccine, but these interventions can be applied to 
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broader population and provides similar benefit to the population. These hygiene interventions 
are intended to reduce the density of virus and infectiousness along routes of transmission 
sources, thus reducing virus exposure and infection risk within the population. Our findings are 
in agreement with study of Brienen et al.154 and Tracht et al.155, that face mask use is effective 
strategy to mitigate influenza transmission. There are some differences in detail of intervention; 
combined face mask use and hand washing versus only face mask use,  face mask use among 
symptomatic individuals versus  the use in general population-both healthy and infected people). 
However, using mask only in infected individuals is still effective.155  
Impact of hygiene interventions are usually depend on the compliance in the population. 
We often found that willingness to use these intervention is low unless there are some threat; for 
example, the 2003 Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) epidemic. In Hong Kong, the 
residents reported high proportion of using masks and washing their hands after contact with 
potentially contaminated objects during the SARS outbreak.103,156,157 Similarly, during influenza 
outbreak, people might have greater concern. So, outbreak investigation and control team can 
encourage people to have higher compliance to hygiene interventions. We observed that even 
compliance of the intervention is low, the impact of intervention is still high, similar to study of 
Tracht et al.155 However, their study reported smaller case reduction, with compliance 10%-50%, 
the face mask intervention can reduce attack rate 5.2%-8.1% (compare with 40.9%-98.0% in our 
study). This may due to a very low effectiveness they used in their models (0.05). 
The adherence of face mask use does not significantly affect proportion of case reduction 
unless the compliance of mask wearing is <25%. This might be because viral shedding peak on 
day 2 after infection (about first day of symptom).117 This can be inferred that wearing mask at 
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least first 2 days of symptoms is recommended, but wearing for the whole period of symptom 
would be the best. 
Impact of intervention among HCWs is slightly lower than other groups. This is because 
we assumed 88% of sick people visit healthcare settings,126 that means hospitals will pool with 
many influenza cases. When patients visit healthcare facilities, they will interact closely with 
HCWs and cause HCWs have repeated exposures. Cross-transmission of influenza infection 
from healthcare workers to patients has been described.33-36 To prevent outbreak in healthcare 
settings, we may consider vaccine intervention combined with personal protection and hygiene. 
We caution to not overinterpret the modeling results. Assuming 88% of sick people visit 
healthcare settings and about 20% of them are hospitalized, this added some level of isolation in 
a background. So, interventions are in addition to standard physician visits and hospitalization. 
Isolation and quarantine are also effective intervention. Halloran et al. simulated the 
effectiveness of a set of intervention strategies; combinations called targeted layered containment 
(TLC) of influenza antiviral treatment and prophylaxis and non-pharmaceutical interventions of 
quarantine, isolation, school closure, and social distancing. They suggested that timely 
implementation of the TLC could substantially lower the influenza attack rate.76 The results in 
this study need to be viewed more as helping to influenza outbreak preparedness, rather than 
being predictive of the precise effectiveness of the interventions.  
 Our study has some limitations. All computer models are simplification of reality and 
cannot account for every possible factor or interaction. We considered all HCWs as a uniform 
group. In fact, they may have different chance of contacting patients based on their duties. Our 
model simply use a same compliance for both face mask wearing and hand washing. Because of 
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the computational costs involved, the current results do not include a sensitivity analysis that 
involved the underlying transmission parameters and case fatality parameters. 
In conclusion, face masks and hand washing are effective strategies (in addition to case 
isolation) for countries with limited supplies of vaccines and antiviral drugs. Modeling is a tool 
to provide decision makers with information for influenza preparedness and control. 
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4.6 TABLES 
Table 12 Specific morbidity and mortality rate of influenza in no intervention scenario 
Population Number 
Case Death 
Number Attack rate 
(%) 
Number Death rate 
(per 100,000) 
All 58,354,744 7,109,427 12.18 22,219 3.80 
Age (years) 
<2 
2-5 
6-18 
19-65 
>65 
 
1,489,947 
3,709,878 
13,091,312 
36,495,519 
3,568,088 
 
161,669 
422,586 
2,005,482 
4,179,841 
339,850 
 
10.85 
11.39 
15.32 
11.45 
9.52 
 
47 
80 
382 
1,299 
412 
 
3.15 
2.14 
2.92 
3.56 
11.54 
People with CMC 4,926,876 544,238 11.05 659 13.38 
Pregnant women 720,069 86,850 12.06 27 3.67 
Healthcare workers 55,550 42,590 76.67 16 27.52 
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Table 13 Morbidity and mortality rate of influenza in combined fask mask and hand washing 
policy by different adherence of face mask wearing 
Vaccine policy 
Case Death 
Number Attack rate 
(%) 
Number Death rate 
(per 100,000) 
No Intervention 7,109,427 12.18 22,219 3.80 
100% of combined intervention (1 day 
wearing mask) 
4,090 0.01 2 <0.01 
100% of combined intervention (2 days 
wearing mask) 
2,199 <0.01 1 <0.01 
100% of combined intervention (wearing 
mask for whole period of symptom) 
1,811 <0.01 1 <0.01 
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Table 14 Morbidity rate of influenza in combined fask mask and hand washing policy by 
coverage and adherence 
Coverage 1 day wearing mask 2 day wearing mask Wearing mask for whole 
period of symptom 
Number of 
case 
Attack rate 
(%) 
Number of 
case 
Attack rate 
(%) 
Number of 
case 
Attack rate 
(%) 
100% 4,090 0.01 2,199 <0.01 1,811 <0.01 
75% 22,601 0.04 18,197 0.03 7,972 0.01 
50% 140,124 0.24 106,313 0.18 66,745 0.11 
25% 1,224,912 2.10 1,067,708 1.83 755,206 1.29 
10% 4,202,914 7.20 3,950,843 6.77 3,577,559 6.13 
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5.0  CONCLUSIONS 
Modeling is a tool to provide decision makers with information for influenza preparedness and 
control. This dissertation used a large-scale agent-based framework of infectious diseases, 
namely FRED, to simulate agent-based models to estimated influenza burden in Thailand and 
assess impact of vaccine allocation policy and non-pharmaceutical interventions (mask wearing 
and hand washing). A new Thai synthetic population was created for this study, and is available 
for researchers who interest to model infectious disease in Thailand (Contact: Dr.Yongjua 
Laosiritaworn (yongjua@gmail.com), Dr. John Grefenstette (gref@pitt.edu), or the University of 
Pittsburgh Public Health Dynamics Laboratory (https://www.phdl.pitt.edu/)). This dissertation 
estimated influenza burden in Thailand and assessed impact of vaccine allocation policy and 
non-pharmaceutical interventions (mask wearing and hand washing). 
Many modeling studies estimated influenza R0 using epidemiologic data from previous 
influenza pandemic or seasonal influenza in developed countries. Despite Thailand had different 
social contacts and lifestyles compare to developed countries, this dissertation found that 
Thailand influenza R0 is comparable to the range of those estimated seasonal influenza R0 from 
those countries. This finding is in agreement to use R0 value 1.4 - 1.5 to model influenza in 
Thailand. Modeling results of no-intervention scenario found that influenza incidence from 
simulation was markedly higher than reported case in the National Notifiable Disease Report. 
This represented a tip of iceberg phenomenon of case-based surveillance. 
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Influenza vaccination has been an effective intervention against influenza illness. This 
dissertation modeled impact of various vaccine strategies to find optimal vaccine policy for 
Thailand. The simulation results demonstrated that the current Thailand influenza vaccine policy 
(year 2014) can reduce influenza morbidity and mortality about 47% and 60% respectively 
(assumed 100% coverage). However, availability of vaccine in 2014 (approximately 3,400,000 
doses) cover about 60% of target population and may reduce the benefit of burden reduction. To 
reach 100% coverage, Thailand has to prepare about 6,000,000 doses of vaccine, but this cost 
may limit the policy. Extended policy to vaccinate preschool and school-aged children yields a 
substantial reduction of influenza morbidity and mortality and is an optimal vaccine strategy. 
Even 50% coverage of this extended policy can avoid about 93% of cases and 94% of deaths, but 
will requires 7,800,000 doses of vaccine. In case of many influenza patients visit hospitals, single 
intervention of vaccinating HCWs seems not effective enough to prevent outbreak in healthcare 
settings. This is because influenza vaccine efficacy is not quite high and cannot provide effective 
prevention if there are high number of contact between infected individuals and HCWs. To 
prevent outbreak in healthcare settings, intervention such as personal protection and hygiene 
should be considered add on vaccine strategy. 
In the event of an influenza pandemic, effective vaccine and antiviral drugs may be 
lacking. Various non-pharmaceutical intervention strategies are a first line of defense against the 
outbreak. This dissertation modeled impact of face mask use plus hand washing intervention on 
outbreak control. The simulation based on scenario that 88% of symptomatic influenza cases will 
visit hospitals and about 22% of them have probability to be hospitalized, this results in some 
level of case isolation in healthcare settings. The results suggested that face mask use among 
symptomatic influenza cases combined with hand washing at population level can decrease 
 100 
transmission significantly to contain the outbreak. Wearing mask at least first 2 days of 
symptoms is recommended, but wearing for the whole period of symptom would be the best. 
Face masks plus hand washing (and case isolation) are effective strategies for countries with 
limited supplies of vaccines and antiviral drugs.  
This study has some strengths. Investigators conducted a national-scale study which 
clinical trials and epidemiological studies may be difficult to perform. Including people with 
CMC and pregnant women makes more complete picture of influenza burden and allow us to 
evaluate impact of vaccine on all target populations in the vaccine policy. The study has some 
limitations. All computer models are simplification of reality and cannot account for every 
possible factor or interaction. Because of the computational costs involved, the current results do 
not include a sensitivity analysis that involved the underlying transmission parameters and case 
fatality 
5.1 PUBLIC HEALTH SIGNIFICANCE 
Influenza is one of re-emerging infectious disease in Thailand. Influenza modeling provides 
information of probable true burden of disease and impact of various control measures. These 
can help in planning of influenza preparedness. This dissertation provided information for health 
policy makers to guide optimized target population for vaccine, and budget allocation for face 
mask, and hand sanitizer campaigns. To prevent influenza outbreak in healthcare settings, triage 
for respiratory diseases and strengthening hygiene and personal protection are recommended.  
General population should be advised for sick leave/self isolation, and encouraged hygiene and 
personal protection. 
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5.2 FUTURE RESEARCH 
Future research should concentrate on further modeling the cost-effectiveness of influenza 
vaccine policy in Thailand, and impact of intervention for influenza (or infectious respiratory 
diseases) prevention in healthcare settings. Additionally, some assessment should be conducted. 
These include influenza surveillance evaluation, willingness and compliance of face mask use 
and hand washing. These will provide additional information to guide policy planners in 
influenza preparedness in Thailand.  
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APPENDIX A: SUPPLEMENTARY METHODS 
A1: SYNTHETIC POPULATION AND ALLOCATION 
1. Generating synthesized households and persons 
Thai census data (year 2000) on household size and age distributions were used to generate the 
synthesized agents and households. The household locations were generated and each household 
in the database was represented as a geographic information system (GIS) "point feature". Point 
features are unique x,y locations containing descriptive tabular attributes. Then population 
records were generated for all households. Each agent had a set of socio-demographic 
characteristics and daily behaviors that included age, sex, employment status, occupation, and 
household location and membership.  
1.1. Assigning agents to schools 
School data (year 2011) from the Thai Ministry of Education on ≈38,000 schools were used to 
determine the distribution of school sizes, number and proportions of children in school as a 
function of age for school assignment. The locations (point) of each school were generated from 
their address code (province, district, and sub-district). The schools assignment method was 
based on the assumption that students are enrolled at the closest school having adequate capacity. 
This assumption is necessary because no national data source of school catchment areas exists. 
The school allocation method assigns agents who are of school age (4 to 18 years of age) to 
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schools. The spatial allocation is based on a minimum path algorithm such that available students 
of a certain grade level will be assigned to the closest school that has capacity for students of that 
grade level. Children who are 4 to 6 years old are assigned only to schools that have kindergarten 
enrollment. The remaining children, ages 7 to 18, are assigned to appropriate schools; primary 
school (7 to 12 years old), lower-secondary schools (12 to 15 years old), and higher-secondary 
schools (15 to 18 years old). Children who enroll in the same school have the same school 
identifier; therefore, we know explicitly which children may come into contact with each other 
based on their school assignments. 
1.2. Assigning agents to workplaces 
Data of Thailand Industrial and Business/service census in year 2011 were used for workplace 
assignment. The data indicated numbers and percentages of workers by size of work place (1 - 
15, 16 - 25, 26 - 30, 31 - 50, 51 - 200, and >200 workers) for Bangkok, Bangkok vicinity, and all 
regions (central, north, northeastern, and south). The locations (point) of workplaces were 
generated. Then, each agent (non-school age population) is assigned to a workplace such that the 
distribution and capacity of each workplace was appropriate. Agents who work in the same 
workplace have the same workplace identifier; therefore, we know explicitly which workers may 
come into contact with each other based on their workplace assignments. 
2. Generating synthesized hospitals and healthcare workers 
To create synthetic Hospitals, we used the actual hospitals (the Latitude and Longitude are true) 
and number of beds in the hospital. We then assume that the number of HCWs who contact 
patients in a hospital is proportional to the number of beds by the value of 1 to 1 (e.g. a hospital 
with 100 beds would have 100 HCWs). The simulation then tries to found a synthetic workplace 
with approximately the same number of employees and then moved the assigned employees to 
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work in the hospital. To determine which hospital a family will visit, we used a gravity model 
where the probability of going to a given hospital was determined by the (number of beds) ÷ 
(distance from household to hospital)^2. Each household was mapped to a hospital randomly. If 
anyone in the household needs to be hospitalized or visits a hospital, then this is the hospital that 
they will visit. To make sure that this was consistent throughout all simulations, we stored the 
mappings of all households to hospitals after the first run of the FRED simulation to a text file 
and used that file to for each subsequent run, rather than reassigning the households each time. 
3. Assigning agents to have medical conditions 
For Chronic Conditions, we used the following age group probabilities: 
• Asthma  
a. All ages = 0.03 
• COPD 
a. Age 16 and over  = 0.004 
• Chronic Renal Disease 
a. Ages 16 and over  = 0.008 
• Diabetes 
a. Ages 15 to 29  = 0.006 
b. Ages 30 to 44  = 0.034 
c. Ages 45 to 59  = 0.101 
d. Ages 60 to 69  = 0.167 
e. Ages 70 to 79  = 0.158 
f. Ages 80 and over  = 0.115 
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• Heart Disease 
a. Ages 15 to 44  = 0.003 
b. Ages 45 to 59  = 0.021 
c. Ages 60 to 69  = 0.028 
d. Ages 70 to 79  = 0.049 
e. Ages 80 and over  = 0.058 
A2: SEVERE OUTCOMES FOLLOWING INFLUENZA 
We assumed the following base values for hospitalization, outpatient-care and case fatality: 
• Hospitalization probability = 0.22. Hospitalization probability came from database of 
Thailand Notifiable Disease Report, that was a proportion of inpatient among reported 
influenza cases. 
• Outpatient-care probability = 0.88.126  
• Case fatality probability = 0.0000715.127 The experimental parameters use a case fatality 
probability of 0.0000715 on each of four days of infection, giving a total probability of 
about 0.00026 or 26 deaths per 100,000 cases. 
We then multiplied these base values by the following assumed values for those with chronic 
Condition:128 
1) Asthma 
a. Hospitalization multiplier = 1.8 
b. Case Fatality multiplier = 1.7 
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 2) COPD 
a. Hospitalization multiplier = 3.3 
b. Case Fatality multiplier = 7.8 
3) Chronic Renal Disease 
a. Hospitalization multiplier = 4.4 
b. Case Fatality multiplier = 22.7 
4) Diabetes 
a. Hospitalization multiplier = 0.9 
b. Case Fatality multiplier = 4.0 
5) Heart Disease 
a. Hospitalization multiplier = 2.0 
b. Case Fatality multiplier = 9.2 
6) Pregnancy (Not a chronic condition, but has multipliers similar to chronic conditions) 
a. Hospitalization multiplier = 6.8 
b. Case Fatality multiplier = 1.9 
Note: For simplicity, the multipliers are applied sequentially for those with multiple conditions 
(e.g. someone with Asthma and COPD would have a case fatality rate of 0.0000715 x 1.7 x 7.8 = 
0.0000948) 
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APPENDIX B: SUPPLEMENTARY TABLES 
B1: SUPPLEMENTARY TABLES FOR METHODS 
Table 15 Prevalence of diabetes and CHD by age group 
Disease Age group 
15-29 30-44 45-59 60-69 70-79 >80 
Diabetes 0.6 3.4 10.1 16.7 15.8 11.5 
CHD 0.3 0.3 2.1 2.8 4.9 5.8 
Source: The 4th National Health Examination Survey of Thailand (year 2008 - 2009) Report 
 
Table 16 Average age-specific fertility rate (per 1,000 female), year 2002 - 2001 
Age of mother (Year) Average rate  
15 - 19 47.62 
20 - 24 79.09 
25 - 29 79.18 
30 - 34 57.56 
35 - 39 27.18 
40 - 44 6.94 
45 - 49 0.6 
Source: Bureau of Health Policy and Strategy: Thailand Ministry of Public Health 
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Table 17 Risk ratios (RR) for severe outcomes following 2009 Influenza A(H1N1) infection 
Risk factors RR of hospitalization RR of death 
Respiratory disease 3.3 (2.0 - 5.8) 7.8 (4.9 - 26.6) 
Asthma 1.8 (1.2 - 2.6) 1.7 (1.5 - 2.1) 
Diabetes 0.9 (0.5 - 1.7) 4.0 (3.1 - 6.9) 
Cardiac disease 2.0 (1.5 - 2.2) 9.2 (5.4 - 10.7) 
Renal disease 4.4 (4.2 - 4.5) 22.7 (21.0 - 25.4) 
Pregnancy 6.8 (4.5 - 12.3) 1.9 (0.0 - 2.6) 
Source: Van Kerkhove et al.128 
Table 18 Age distribution of the synthetic population 
Age (years) Number Percentage 
<2 1,489,947 2.55 
2-5 3,709,878 6.36 
6-18 13,091,312 22.43 
19-65 36,495,519 62.54 
>=65 3,568,088 6.11 
Total 58,354,744 
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B2: SUPPLEMENTARY RESULTS FOR MANUSCRIPT 2 
Table 19 Proportion of cases prevented for target population vaccine policy , by different 
vaccine coverage 
Population 
% of cases that can be avoided (95%CI) 
100% Coverage 75% Coverage 50% Coverage 
Total population 47.06% (46.97, 47.14) 36.49% (36.40, 36.58) 25.70% (25.61, 25.79) 
Age (years) 
<2 
2-5 
6-18 
19-65 
>65 
62.62% (62.08, 63.17) 
45.12% (44.76, 45.48) 
41.86% (41.70, 42.02) 
46.57% (46.46, 46.68) 
78.74% (78.38, 79.09) 
50.31% (49.74, 50.88) 
34.96% (34.59, 35.33) 
32.06% (31.90, 32.23) 
35.88% (35.76, 35.99) 
65.41% (65.03, 65.78) 
36.19% (35.60, 36.79) 
24.44% (24.06, 24.82) 
22.13% (21.96, 22.30) 
25.28% (25.16, 25.40) 
48.62% (48.22, 49.01) 
People with CMC 84.17% (83.90, 84.44) 69.74% (69.45, 70.02) 51.57% (51.26, 51.87) 
Pregnant women 66.35% (65.62, 67.08) 53.47% (52.71, 54.23) 38.94% (38.14, 39.74) 
Healthcare workers 3.75% (3.09, 4.41) 3.57% (2.91, 4.23) 2.56% (1.90, 3.22) 
* Target population: healthcare personnel, persons who have chronic health conditions, all
persons aged > 65 years, all children from 6 months through 2 years of age, pregnant women
 % of cases that can be avoided = (attack rate of no vaccination - attack rate of vaccine
policies) x 100 ÷ attack rate of no vaccination
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Table 20 Proportion of deaths prevented for target population vaccine policy , by different 
vaccine coverage 
Population 
% of deaths that can be avoided (95%CI) 
100% Coverage 75% Coverage 50% Coverage 
Total population 59.61% (54.68, 64.54) 47.41% (42.27, 52.55) 34.96% (29.62, 40.31) 
Age (years) 
<2 
2-5 
6-18 
19-65 
>65 
 
57.14% (22.97, 91.31) 
44.86% (17.45, 72.28) 
43.85% (31.31, 56.38) 
57.93% (51.44, 64.41) 
82.66% (72.20, 93.12) 
 
50.15% (15.16, 85.15) 
41.98% (14.31,  69.65) 
30.75% (17.70, 43.80) 
45.96% (39.21, 52.71) 
68.19% (57.11, 79.28) 
 
41.03% (4.99, 77.08) 
29.73% (1.01, 58.45) 
25.55% (12.30, 38.80) 
32.55% (25.51, 39.59) 
51.61% (39.85, 63.38) 
People with CMC 85.39% (77.22, 93.56) 71.34% (62.68, 80.00) 54.58% (45.38, 63.79) 
Pregnant women 72.97% (30.00, 115.94) 60.54% (15.52, 105.56) 47.57% (0.50, 94.64) 
Healthcare workers 29.91% (-35.47, 95.28) 27.10% (-38.81, 93.01) 18.69% (-48.80, 86.19) 
* Target population: healthcare personnel, persons who have chronic health conditions, all 
persons aged > 65 years, all children from 6 months through 2 years of age, pregnant women 
 % of deaths that can be avoided = (mortality rate of no vaccination - mortality rate of vaccine 
policies) x 100 ÷ mortality rate of no vaccination 
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Table 21 Proportion of cases prevented for target population + children 2-5 years old vaccine 
policy , by different vaccine coverage 
Population 
% of cases that can be avoided (95%CI) 
100% Coverage 75% Coverage 50% Coverage 
Total population 72.59% (72.51, 72.67) 60.65% (60.56, 60.73) 43.19% (43.10, 43.27) 
Age (years) 
<2 
2-5 
6-18 
19-65 
>65 
 
84.11% (83.61, 84.61) 
89.90% (89.60, 90.20) 
68.99% (68.85%, 69.14) 
70.81% (70.71, 70.91) 
88.70% (88.36, 89.04) 
 
74.26% (73.74, 74.78) 
79.48% (79.17, 79.79) 
57.08% (56.92, 57.23) 
58.50% (58.39, 58.61) 
78.15% (77.80, 78.51) 
 
57.80% (57.25, 58.36) 
61.60% (61.26, 61.93) 
40.19% (40.02, 40.35) 
40.82% (40.71, 40.94) 
60.10% (59.71, 60.48) 
People with CMC 91.60% (91.34, 91.86) 80.87% (80.59, 81.14) 62.40% (62.10, 62.69) 
Pregnant women 81.24% (80.55, 81.92) 69.47% (68.75, 70.19) 51.19% (50.42, 51.96) 
Healthcare workers 7.28% (6.60, 7.95) 8.62% (7.95, 9.30) 2.05% (1.39, 2.70) 
* Target population: healthcare personnel, persons who have chronic health conditions, all 
persons aged > 65 years, all children from 6 months through 2 years of age, pregnant women 
 % of cases that can be avoided = (attack rate of no vaccination - attack rate of vaccine policies) 
x 100 ÷ attack rate of no vaccination 
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Table 22 Proportion of deaths prevented for target population + children 2-5 years old vaccine 
policy , by different vaccine coverage 
Population 
% of deaths that can be avoided (95%CI) 
100% Coverage 75% Coverage 50% Coverage 
Total population 79.27% (74.70, 83.83) 66.78% (61.97, 71.58) 50.57% (45.48, 55.66) 
Age (years) 
<2 
2-5 
6-18 
19-65 
>65 
 
82.07% (51.02, 113.11) 
89.73% (66.62, 112.84) 
71.90% (60.55, 83.26) 
77.02% (70.99, 83.05) 
90.88% (80.79, 100.97) 
 
71.43% (103.85, 39.01) 
82.70% (58.86, 106.54) 
58.74% (46.81, 70.66) 
64.31% (57.97, 70.64) 
78.43% (67.78, 89.07) 
 
59.88% (26.04, 93.72) 
60.18% (34.15, 86.21) 
41.11% (28.47, 53.76) 
48.08% (41.38, 54.78) 
64.27% (53.22, 75.52) 
People with CMC 92.22% (84.29, 100.14) 81.29% (72.97, 89.61) 65.16 (56.30, 74.03) 
Pregnant women 87.57% (47.14, 127.99) 81.62% (40.14, 123.10) 60.00% (14.89, 105.11) 
Healthcare workers 28.97% (-36.58, 94.53) 41.12% (-22.06, 104.30) 29.91% (-35.47, 95.28) 
* Target population: healthcare personnel, persons who have chronic health conditions, all 
persons aged > 65 years, all children from 6 months through 2 years of age, pregnant women 
 % of deaths that can be avoided = (mortality rate of no vaccination - mortality rate of vaccine 
policies) x 100 ÷ mortality rate of no vaccination 
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Table 23 Proportion of cases prevented for target population + children 2-18 years old vaccine 
policy , by different vaccine coverage 
Population 
% of cases that can be avoided (95%CI) 
100% Coverage 75% Coverage 50% Coverage 
Total population 99.37% (99.30, 99.44) 98.20% (98.13, 98.27) 92.88% (92.81, 92.96) 
Age (years) 
<2 
2-5 
6-18 
19-65 
>65 
 
99.65% (99.19, 100.11) 
99.76% (99.48, 100.05) 
99.78% (99.65, 99.91) 
99.10% (99.01, 99.19) 
99.71% (99.39, 100.03) 
 
98.83% (98.37, 99.30) 
99.07% (98.78, 99.35) 
99.09% (98.96, 99.22) 
97.61% (97.52, 97.70) 
98.89% (98.57, 99.21) 
 
94.54% (94.06, 95.01) 
95.05% (94.76, 95.34) 
95.06% (94.93, 95.19) 
91.41% (91.32, 91.51) 
94.66% (94.33, 94.99) 
People with CMC 99.78% (99.53, 100.03) 99.03% (98.78, 99.28) 94.94% (94.69, 95.20) 
Pregnant women 99.50% (98.88, 100.13) 98.36% (97.73, 98.99) 93.10% (92.46, 93.75) 
Healthcare workers 76.60% (75.98, 77.22) 59.72% (59.04, 60.40) 32.49% (31.78, 33.20) 
* Target population: healthcare personnel, persons who have chronic health conditions, all 
persons aged > 65 years, all children from 6 months through 2 years of age, pregnant women 
 % of cases that can be avoided = (attack rate of no vaccination - attack rate of vaccine policies) 
x 100 ÷ attack rate of no vaccination 
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Table 24 Proportion of deaths prevented for target population + children 2-18 years old vaccine 
policy , by different vaccine coverage 
Population 
% of deaths that can be avoided (95%CI) 
100% Coverage 75% Coverage 50% Coverage 
Total population 99.47% (95.29, 103.64) 98.35% (94.15, 102.54) 93.83% (89.54, 98.11) 
Age (years) 
<2 
2-5 
6-18 
19-65 
>65 
 
99.39% (70.72, 100.11) 
99.82% (77.79, 121.85) 
99.85% (89.81, 109.89) 
99.26% (93.80, 104.72) 
99.69% (90.02, 109.36) 
 
96.96% (67.94, 125.98) 
99.28% (77.19, 121.37) 
98.95% (88.87, 109.03) 
98.00% (92.51, 103.49) 
98.86% (89.14, 108.57) 
 
95.74% (66.55, 124.94) 
95.32% (72.79, 117.84) 
96.56% (86.36, 106.76) 
92.52% (86.88, 98.16) 
94.90% (85.00, 104.80) 
People with CMC 99.67% (92.03, 107.32) 99.09% (91.42, 106.76) 94.99% (87.17, 102.82) 
Pregnant women 98.92% (60.59, 137.25) 100.00% (61.87, 138.13) 92.97% (53.53, 132.41) 
Healthcare workers 82.24% (27.85, 136.64) 68.22% (10.68, 125.77) 62.62% (3.86, 121.37) 
* Target population: healthcare personnel, persons who have chronic health conditions, all 
persons aged > 65 years, all children from 6 months through 2 years of age, pregnant women 
 % of deaths that can be avoided = (mortality rate of no vaccination - mortality rate of vaccine 
policies) x 100 ÷ mortality rate of no vaccination 
 
 
 
 
 
 115 
APPENDIX C: SUPPLEMENTARY FIGURES 
The numbers of influenza cases by week from 2003 to 2012 were obtained.  An epidemic curve 
with logarithm scale for each year was plotted. Linear increase in cases on a logarithmic scale 
indicates exponential increase in the number of cases. The figure 14 presents 10 graphs of the 
analyzed years 
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Year 2006: wk 21 - 22 
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 120 
  
Figure 14 Number of reported influenza case in bangkok, 2003 - 2012  
 
Year 2003: wk 19 - 20 
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